Wright State University

CORE Scholar
Browse all Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2014

Investigation of Mirror Image Bias: Evidence For the Use of
Psychophysiological Measures as Indicators of Cognitive
Heuristics
Caroline R. Salchak
Wright State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all
Part of the Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering Commons

Repository Citation
Salchak, Caroline R., "Investigation of Mirror Image Bias: Evidence For the Use of Psychophysiological
Measures as Indicators of Cognitive Heuristics" (2014). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 1378.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/1378

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE
Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu.

INVESTIGATION OF MIRROR IMAGE BIAS: EVIDENCE FOR THE USE OF
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES AS INDICATORS OF COGNITIVE HEURISTICS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Engineering

By

CAROLINE SALCHAK
B.S., Wright State University, 2013

2014
Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

26 June 2014

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY
SUPERVISION BY CAROLINE SALCHAK ENTITLED Eye Tracking and Physiological
Measures: An Alternative to Mirror Image Bias BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Science
in Engineering

______________________________
Mary Fendley, PhD
Thesis Director

______________________________
Thomas Hangartner, PhD, Chair
Department of Biomedical, Industrial and
Human Factors Engineering
Committee on
Final Examination
______________________________
Nasser Kashou, PhD
______________________________
Jason Parker, PhD
______________________________
Mary Fendley, PhD
______________________________
Robert E.W. Fyffe, Ph.D.
Vice President for Research
Dean of the Graduate School

ABSTRACT
Salchak, Caroline R M.S.Egr., Department of Biomedical and Human Factors Engineering,
Wright State University, 2014. Eye Tracking and Physiological Measures: An Alternative to
Mirror Image Bias Detection.

The Mirror Imaging Bias (MIB) is gaining attention as a prominent quality factor
in analysts’ performance. MIB is an irrationality in which analysts perceive and process
information through the filter of personal experience. As evidenced by notable historical
events, the consequences of this bias can be dramatic. A way to understand MIB in
humans is sought. How analysts analyze data, are trained, and interact with biases is
explored. An experiment testing for the appearance of MIB was designed and completed.
Measures from an eye tracker as well as physiological measures were collected. Results
show a significant correlation between pupil diameter and the appearance of MIB. There
is a significant correlation between response time as well as the number of fixations and
the viewpoint of the question. These results support that MIB is used as a shortcut to
minimize mental workload in decision making in uncertain situations.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Mirror Imaging Bias (MIB) is one of the most prevalent biases among
analysts and has caused many failures in detecting harmful attacks through assessment
mishaps. Mirror Imaging and Theory of Mind are understood to be tightly interwoven as
cognitive biases; they both occur when judging or predicting the actions of a third party.
Mirror Imaging is an irrationality in which analysts perceive and process information
through the filter of personal experience; this may be driven in part by cultural
differences. In the case of Mirror Imaging Bias (MIB), if looking at a situation that
another person is experiencing, you predict what you would do. In comparison, Theory of
Mind (ToM) is the ability to predict and interpret the thoughts and actions of another by
taking on their perspective. In the case of MIB, if looking at a situation that another
person is experiencing, you predict what they would do.
This paper seeks to find an explanation and a way to determine and detect the
MIB in humans who are faced with the analysis of other cultures and their actions. It will
do so by looking into past occurrences of the MIB such as the sinking of the Lusitania,
Pearl Harbor, and 9-11’s attack on the World Trade Center. It will then go into several
possible reasons on why these failures of analyst work appear so frequently by looking
into how analysts analyze the data they are given, the training that they receive, and
cognitive biases that affect the population. When analyzing MIB, this paper will go over
the three possible reasons for the bias. The first is that MIB is the failure of ToM. ToM is
1

explained and broken down further into 1) inhibition of one’s own self, and 2) belief
reasoning. The second possible cause for MIB is a cultural bias. It is felt that much of the
reason behind MIB in analysts is that we assume that other cultures will think and act a
certain way even though there might be clear evidence otherwise. The third explanation
for MIB is cognitive action – or mindreading. Mindreading is the activity of representing
specific mental states of others, for example, their perceptions, goals, beliefs,
expectations, and the like (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The final part of the paper will go
into the steps taken toward an experiment: building of the stimuli, testing, and analysis of
the data collected. Through this experiment it is found that Mirror Imaging Bias is
enticed 40.1% of the time and Theory of Mind is enticed 21.2% of the time when viewing
stimuli. Similarly it shows that when comparing the overall results of participants, the
average pupil diameter shows a significant difference between MIB and ToM and
therefore would be a good method to detect the bias. However when delving into each
individual participant, each had different types of data that showed significance to prove
one bias occurs over the other.
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II.

BACKGROUND

The following sections will review topics such as the Intelligence Analyst, the
potential reasons behind their successes and failures, and several cognitive biases that
affect most people.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYST
The Mirror Imaging Bias isn’t necessarily a well-known problem within the
mainstream population. However within the Intelligence community, it is extremely
important. Analysts are well aware of the problems that MI causes. In fact, MI is the most
common ISR irrationality, is an unavoidable cognitive trap, and has been blamed for
catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and 9/11 (Pipes, 1995; Heuer, 1999). Well trained
analysts are able to see that they are falling prey to the bias when they are unwilling to
examine variants of what they consider most reasonable in light of their personal frame of
reference (Witlin, 2008), but analysts who haven’t been trained to recognize the signs are
more likely to partake in the bias. To fully understand the problems that analysts face
with the Mirror Imaging Bias, we must go in depth into why analysts came to be within
our government and what their job entails.
Intelligence, whether it’s in the United States or in other countries, has only one
function: to uncover foreign threats to national security. The Central Intelligence Agency
was created in 1947 with the signing of the National Security Act by President Harry S.
3

Truman. The National Security Act charged the CIA with coordinating the nation’s
intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence affecting
national security (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). He [Truman] did so despite
protests that he was setting up an "American Gestapo." (Pipes, 1995)

Intelligence

analysis involves predicting thoughts and reactions of allies and adversaries, who often
have values and beliefs different from those of the analyst. This has been the case
throughout the years and these differences in beliefs and values have caused plenty of
issues.
There have been many successes and failures that have come from the CIA; these
will be outlined later in this section. For now we’ll focus on some facts that form around
what goes into and comes out of the CIA.


By far, the largest recipient of intelligence appropriations is the Department of
Defense. Leaks from Congress in 1995 indicated that of the $28 billion
budgeted annually for intelligence, the CIA receives only $3 billion (Pipes,
1995). Clearly this number has changed since then, but it is a good
representation on how much of a focus the government has on intelligence.



The CIA is headed by a Director, who is appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate (Hayden, 2009).



They collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate
means – however they do not exercise police, subpoena, or law enforcement
powers (Hayden, 2009).

4



They correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security and
provide appropriate dissemination of such intelligence (Hayden, 2009).



There is a 21.4% failure rate of Ops Intelligence Apprentice in the Advanced
Training. (Casebeer, 2012) These high wash out rates may be due to lack of a
cognitive flexibility – this includes the MIB.

Betts (1978) brought up the point that “Particular failures [for analysts] are
accorded disproportionate significance if they are considered in isolation rather than in
terms of the general ratio of failures to successes; the record of success is less striking
because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen” (Betts, 1978). While
there have been many successes that have come from analysts – which far outnumber the
failures – the failures are much more costly and continuously seem to overshadow the
successes. “There should be absolutely no tolerance of analysts who consistently produce
flawed assessments or assessments that hedge to the point of being useless” (Pipes,
1995). Some of the main failures of analysts can be seen outlined below. In each case, as
suggested by Betts (1978) there are two phenomena that occur: first, “evidence of an
impending attack was available, but did not flow efficiently up the chains of command,”
and second, “fragmentary indicators of alarm that did not reach decision makers were
dismissed because they contradicted strategic estimates or assumptions” (Betts, 1978).
The MIB is tightly knit into the threads of these failures and will be explained as we go
along. In each case, it brings to life the phrase “Hindsight is always 20-20.”
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EXAMPLES OF MIB
PRE-CIA: 1915: WWI - SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA
America had remained neutral during the start of World War One. And although
America didn’t join the war until two years after the sinking of the Lusitania, it is
believed that it had a major impact in the relationship between the USA and WWI. In
1915, the Lusitania set off from New York to Liverpool. The path the ship would take
brought it directly through a known “European War Zone” in which submarines had
already brought many ships to their end (Lusitania, ship, 2013). This should have been
enough to cause pause to potential passengers. On top of that, there were advertisements
in the New York newspapers paid for by the German Embassy that any ship that sailed
into the “European War Zone” was a potential target for German submarines. It was
printed in forty U.S. newspapers as follows:
“Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that
a state of war exists between Germany . . . and Great Britain . . . and that
travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do
so at their own risk” (The National Archives, n.d.).
It is told that many passengers even received anonymous telegrams advising them
not to travel. However, the passengers dismissed these warnings and “came to the
conclusion that the luxury liner simply was not a legitimate target of the Germans as it
had no military value.” The ship was sunk on the 7th of May and only took 18 minutes to
sink. In a response to the German government, the American government wrote “that no
warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted
6

as an excuse of palliation for that act or an abatement of the responsibility for its
commission.” which essentially meant that it was not an excuse to attack the innocent
people even though a warning was posted (Wilson, 2009). Needless to say, anyone who
had received the warnings or had seen the advertisements experienced a form of Mirror
Imaging Bias by assuming that the Lusitania was not going to be a target to the German
U boats.
PRE-CIA: 1941: NAZI INVASION OF THE USSR
On June 22, 1941 Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union (“Invasion of the,”
2013). This was a surprise to not only the Soviet Union, but also to the rest of the world.
One specific quote by L. Trotsky several years prior to the invasion brings light to the
false assumption that the Nazi’s would not do such a risky thing:
“The very possibility of a rule of the Nazis over the German people was
created by the unbearable tenseness of social antagonisms in Germany.
These antagonisms have not been removed, and not even weakened, but
only suppressed, by the lid of fascism. A war will bring them to the
surface. Hitler has far less chances than had Wilhelm II of carrying a war
to victory.” (Trotsky, 1937, p. 104)
As human beings, analysts and decision makers back then had assumed that Hitler
would make decisions like a “normal” person such as themselves. However, what these
people failed to notice was the fact that he was from an entirely different background and
mindset than what they were used to. This is why the Mirror Imaging Bias showed itself

7

in this situation – they assumed incorrectly that Hitler, and therefore the Nazis, would
make the same decisions that they would.
PRE-CIA: 1941: WWII – ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
At another turning point in a war – this time World War II – Americans were
“shocked by the Japanese bombing of the American Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
There was mayhem everywhere; over 3,500 Americans were killed or wounded, 350
aircraft were destroyed or damaged, and all eight battleships of the U.S Pacific Fleet were
suck or badly damaged” (“Why did japan,” n.d.). However, even though it seemed as
though this attack was completely out of the blue, there were signs that seemed extremely
obvious after the fact.
After the attack, analysis revealed that the U.S. had had plenty of information
about a pending Japanese strike – enough to anticipate and prevent it. However, the U.S
took no action because it “lacked an organization capable of collating the diffuse bits and
pieces of intelligence information” (Pipes, 1995). Similarly, Roberta Wohlsetter in her
1962 study Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision “demonstrated that although the U.S.
Government picked up Japanese signals (including conversations, decoded cables, and
ship movements), it failed to distinguish signals from noise. [They were unable] to
understand which signals were meaningful because it was unimaginable that the Japanese
might do something as "irrational" as attacking the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific fleet”
(McFate, 2005). This erroneous assumption is the core of the Mirror Imaging Bias.

8

1962: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
“In 1962, it [The CIA] denied that Russia intended to install missiles in Cuba up
to the very moment when photographic imagery proved beyond the shadow of a doubt
that the missiles were being deployed” (Pipes, 1995). After an American spy plane
secretly photographed nuclear missile sites being built by the Soviet Union in Cuba,
President Kennedy did his best to avoid any crisis. He met with his advisors, created a
blockade around the island, and spoke to the nation about the crisis through a televised
address (“Cuban missile crisis,” n.d.). There were thirteen days in which the USA and the
Soviet Union were on the edge of a nuclear crisis (Allison, 1969). Had the crisis not been
resolved and instead a war started, millions of lives would have been lost. The Cuban
Missile Crisis was ended by an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in
which the Soviets would remove the missiles from Cuba and in return the U.S wouldn’t
invade Cuba. This agreement avoided the possibility of a nuclear war – which would
have been devastating to both parties.
The US might have seen it coming even before the Soviet Union began building
the sites in Cuba. In the early 60's it could not see any conceivable interest on the part of
the Soviet Union in placing nuclear missiles in Cuba since Moscow had to be aware that
the United States would not tolerate such deployments: they were simply "too risky"
(Pipes, 1995). Even though there might not have been any observable information that
the U.S. would have seen prior to 1962, they should not have dismissed the Soviet Union
from doing something such as setting up a nuclear site so close to the United States.
Doing so placed them within the boundaries of the MIB.
9

1998: INDIA’S NUCLEAR TESTS
“The Republican chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence alleged
Tuesday that U.S. intelligence gathering suffered a "colossal failure" in not detecting
India's intention to set off three nuclear blasts this week” (Begleiter, 1998). That’s how
one CNN article described the failure to detect the coming of nuclear tests in India. It
should have not been a surprise, even though India did a good job of hiding their efforts;
there were plenty of signs that should have been caught by analysts. Especially after the
potential issue for Indian nuclear tests had been given “close scrutiny” in 1995. Similarly,
India refused to endorse the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in August
1996, and it had been discussed that they might test nuclear warheads in light of the
Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) advocacy of the ‘Hindu bomb’ (Walker, 1998). The
Indian government had apparently given repeated warnings of its intentions to proceed
with nuclear tests (Begleiter, 1998).
The major failure was not the fact that when India performed nuclear tests on 11
and 13 May, 1998 it caught analysts off guard. Again, there were plenty of signs that
India was prepping for nuclear tests that were missed by analysts. The real problem – and
consequently the relation to the MIB - was an “assumption by intelligence analysts and
policymakers that the Indians would not test their nuclear weapons because Americans
would not test nuclear weapons in similar circumstances” (McFate, 2005).
2011: 9/11 AND THE BATTLE WITH IRAQ
One of the most recent CIA failures came to be within the event of 9/11. The
entire world seemed to be in shock as they watched the news about how the World Trade
10

Center had been struck by not one, but two, aircraft in the form of a terrorist attack. There
are countless stories about people who were directly and indirectly affected by what
happened; still to this day, people rally around the concept of 9/11 and people are still
touched by the stories that emerge.
The chances of this event being prevented are slim. However, analysts could have
done a better job at anticipating a massive terrorist attack such as this one. There were
signs leading up to 9/11: the main one that had been released by the White House was the
fact that on August 6th, a classified review of threats posted by Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaeda had been placed on the presidents’ desk. Analysts had seen some sort of
premonition that something was coming, but the White House took no steps to resolve it.
They thought it was just “bluster” and that they assumed “Bin Laden was merely
pretending to be planning an attack to distract the administration from Saddam Hussein,
whom the neoconservatives saw as a greater threat” (Eichenwald, 2012). Again, this
failure to comprehend beyond what we assume shows the Mirror Imaging Bias.
Beyond 9/11 and into the war on terror, U.S. Representative "Ike" Skelton wrote a
letter Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in which he said: "In simple terms, if we
had better understood the Iraqi culture and mindset, our war plans would have been even
better than they were, the plan for the postwar period and all of its challenges would have
been far better, and we [would have been] better prepared for the 'long slog' ... to win
peace in Iraq” (McFate, 2005).

11

Many intelligence failures can be attributed to identifiable and remediable flaws
of methodology (Pipes, 1995). Failures within the analyst environment can be attributed
to three separate causes: improper data, lack of training or knowledge of the culture, and
cognitive biases.

IMPROPER DATA: LACK OF DATA, POOR DATA, TOO MUCH DATA
The first potential reason, of many, failures occur within the analyst environment
has to do with the data that analysts receive. It is said that the most frequent sources of
breakdowns in intelligence “lies in the process of amassing timely data, communicating
them to decision makers, and impressing the latter with the validity or relevance of the
information” (Betts, 1978). Each individual case is different, but it always seems that the
data that is given to the analysts isn’t necessarily the best that it could be. It is said that
for analysts the data analysis, and more specifically divining political intentions from the
data, is the most difficult aspect (Pipes, 1995). Similarly, in failures of intelligence, the
most mistakes are made by “decision makers who consume the products of intelligence
services”, not necessarily by those who collect raw information or those who produce
analyses (Betts, 1978). Betts makes a point that “optimal decisions in defense policy
depend on the use of strategic intelligence: the acquisition, analysis, and appreciation of
relevant data” (Betts, 1978, p. 35). Analysts must take whatever data they are given –
whether it is too much data, poor data (that has gaps of information), or not enough data –
and be able to produce a usable analysis that could potentially save the United States
from an impending attack. Similarly, the more ambiguous data is, the more likely
analysts are going to rely on their preconceptions about the situation or culture. Betts
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point out that uncertainty from analysts reflects inadequacy of data or lack of
information. However, uncertainty can also come about because there is an excess of
data. For example, in a war setting there is an overload of analyses, battlefield statistics,
reports, bulletins, and communications intercepts at a rate too fast for analysts to fully
analyze them in a short amount of time (Betts, 1978).
Information Warfare (IW) is defined by Johnson (2004) as a series of elements
including: attack and defense capabilities and techniques, supporting intelligence
collection for targeting information (locations, strengths, vulnerabilities, defenses),
supporting intelligence collection for battle damage assessment, and supporting
intelligence collection for attack indications and warning. Johnson describes the target of
IW as the adversary’s decision process. It is reached through a “campaign that involves
generation of effects on the adversary’s information that prevents or prompts certain
actions, thereby creating an advantage for the attacker” (Johnson, 2004, p. 50).
There are multiple types of attacks that analysts seek to prevent through
Intelligence warfare. These can be seen in Table 1. It also shows what kind of damage
could be done if the attack is not prevented (Functional Effect). There are three different
target types that could be attacked, as shown in Table 1: the information layer, which if
attacked can create technical effects, the information-management layer, which if
attacked causes functional effects, and the decision-process layer, which if attacked
creates operational effects (Johnson, 2004).
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Table 1: Johnsons (2004) chart explaining types of attacks prevented by Information Warfare
shows the span of damage that can potentially be done through a failure in preventing attack.
Type of Attack

Target
Layer

Technical
Effect

Functional Effect

Operational
Effect

Communication
Jamming
Communications
intrusion – short
control message

Information
System
Information
Management

Signal
Blockage
None

Information Loss

Delayed or
wrong decision
Delay, confusion

Communications
intrusion – short
information
message
Computer Virus

Decision
Process

None – link
continues to
exist

Information
System
Information
Management

System
Paralysis
None

Loss of data, loss of
function at node
Delay or overload
amounting to loss of
function

Decision
Process

None

None

Decision
Process

None

None

Network Worm

PSYOPS/
propaganda
messages
Military operation
as PSYOPS
maneuver

Information misrouting,
self-generated overload
(diagnostic, correction,
repeat messages
Negligible – short message
does not affect
routing/handling/storage

Delay, confusion,
wrong decision

Delayed or
wrong decision
Delayed
decisions;
deliberate
shutdown of
unaffected nodes
Decision
Influence
Perception
Manipulation

So, in order for intelligence agents to be able to perform all aspects of IW, they
have many kinds of information that comes in to them. This information may or may not
be useful or actually informative for the purpose of detecting any potential harmful
occurrence to the United States. In the case of poor data taken in by intelligence
military/operational agencies tends to be analyzed and assessed more optimistically
compared to ambiguous data analyzed by nonoperational units/CIA which tends to be
analyzed and assessed more pessimistically (Betts, 1978).
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PHASES OF ANALYSIS
Analyst work can be broken down into two types of phases: time-related phases
and task-related phases. The first, time-related phases are shown in Table 2, and include
real-time, near real-time, and forensic analysis. Paul (2013) mentions these phases in the
detection of vehicles that might be a threat (Paul, 2013). These phases can be correlated
to actions of an individual or group and detecting whether or not they might be a threat.
MIB can show itself in any given phase, although is most prominent in the immediate or
real-time decisions that have to be made without any time for analysis or thinking more
in-depth about what the other individual or group might do in relation to their own
culture or beliefs. Similarly, each of the phases in either one of the categories, time or
task, have improper data. This data is not necessarily relevant data, so analysts could
hypothetically have both ends of the spectrum: too much data to sort through as well as
not enough relevant data. The difference between any of the given phases is the time
available or the kind of task done to the data.
Table 2: Time-related phases of analyst work have three phases: real-time, near real-time, and forensic.
The Mirror Image Bias can appear in any of the phases, although it is most likely to happen in the realtime phase.

Type of Analysis

Supporting Information

Phase 1
Phase 2

Real-Time
Near Real-Time

Phase 3

Forensic

Sensor data is used to detect immediate events
Groups or patterns are detected and analyzed with short delays
Groups or patterns are detected and analyzed with a week or more
delays

The second group, task-related phases, are mentioned by the work of Goodall,
Lutters, & Komlodi (2004). In the experiment, performed by analysts, all participants
followed a similar three-phase process: monitoring, analysis, and response (Goodall,
Lutters, & Komlodi, 2004). These phases are described in Table 3. Although the research
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by Goodall et al. was done to analyze how analysts detect system intrusion, it can easily
be correlated to how analysts would detect threats on a larger and more general scale. The
first phase, monitoring, encompasses the daily “mundane” tasks of ongoing surveillance
in order to look for “indications of anomalous or malicious activity” (Goodall et al.,
2004, p. 1423). In this stage, analysts must deal with information overload and have to
find ways to reduce the data into a more manageable level by either scanning through it
faster or by some other method. In the second phase, analysis is done. Goodall describes
the transition from the first to the second phase as beginning with a “security trigger
event” (Goodall et al., 2004, p. 1424). In this phase, analysts must determine whether the
trigger is an actual threat, and if it is to determine how severe of a threat it is. In this
phase it is important for the analyst to have knowledge of the environment so they can
easily determine severity of a threat. For example, what seems like normal activity in one
environment may be indicative of illicit activity in another (Goodall et al., 2004). In the
third and final phase, response, a final assessment must be done and a decision be made
on what to do. The most common responses come in the form of intervention, feedback,
and reporting (Goodall et al., 2004).
Table 3: Task-related phases of analyst work are broken down into: monitoring, analysis, and response.
The Mirror Imaging Bias can appear in any of the phases, although it is most likely to happen in the phases
that require analysts to make decisions quickly.

Type of Analysis

Supporting Information

Phase 1
Phase 2

Monitoring
Analysis

Phase 3

Response

Ongoing surveillance, mundane daily tasks, information overload
Assessment of trigger events and severity, important for analyst to
have extensive knowledge of environment
Intervention, feedback, reporting
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As with the first set of phases, MIB can show itself in any of the given taskrelated phases. It is important to understand when MIB appears and how to take steps to
resolve the problems it elicits.

LACK OF TRAINING AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE CULTURE
The second possibility why analysts have failures has to do with a combination of
not having sufficient training and knowledge of the culture with which they are dealing.
More failures of intelligence have come about in the stages of interpretation and response
of data (Betts, 1978). In other words, analysts who are tasked to analyze and interpret
data are likely to fail by assuming something falsely from the facts. Knowing the culture
with which you are dealing is extremely important, not only in a general sense, but also in
terms of MIB. Pipes, in his paper “What to do About the CIA,” explains that analysts
should be required to have a profound knowledge of the societies they deal with in order
to avoid MIB. If they do this, they will slowly learn to avoid the American viewpoint and
understand that not all cultures are the same (Pipes, 1995).
This lack of training creates an issue because the insufficient training rests upon a
very strong tendency of a specific culture thinking that all other cultures behave and
make decisions like their own culture. People are, understandably, drawn to thinking like
their own culture. Americans tend to have a false understanding that is embedded within
themselves that “fundamentally all peoples are the same – that is, like white, middle-class
Americans – and if given a chance will behave like white, middle-class Americans”
(Pipes, 1995). Of course, this doesn’t hold true for everyone. There are some individuals
who are born with a natural understanding that not everyone will think and act as the
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individual would if faced with the same situation – this trait is ideally what one looks for
in an analyst. Some of this understanding can be taught, but it must be ingrained into a
person for it to become effective.
Those that are either taught or have the natural skill to know that not all decisions
are made alike between cultures are more likely to have successes in analyzing the data
and situations they are given. Arthur Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force
Transformation brought forth the point that “knowledge of one’s own enemy and his
culture and society may be more important than knowledge of his order of battle”
(McFate, 2005). Many times analysts are faced with data that seems to lay out the “order
of battle”, or their potential plans to harm a countries people, but it is dismissed because
the analysts don’t know why they would do those things – they don’t have an
understanding of the culture. However, when versed in the culture itself it makes much
more sense and they are able to better detect why and what the adversary will do in the
future. One example of a success because of knowledge of the culture comes from Sir
Robert Vansittart. In the 1930’s he provided an “accurate assessment of Nazi capabilities
and intentions, including the likelihood of Germany’s rapprochement with the Soviet
Union. He succeeded because he knew Germany better than the professionals of the
Secret Service” (Pipes, 1995). Another example is in Joseph G. Grew, who had spent an
extensive time in Tokyo, Japan as an American ambassador. He responded to judgments
that the Japanese could not contemplate an attack on the US by warning against “any
possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict
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with the US. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity
cannot be measured by our own standards of logic” (Pipes, 1995).
To bring this section to a conclusion, another quote by Pipes summarizes the need
for training and knowledge of the culture with which the analyst is dealing:
“The more imaginative the analyst and the better versed in the cultures
with which he deals, the less likely he will be to attribute to others his own
values and objectives” (Pipes, 1995).

COGNITIVE BIASES
The third potential reason why analysts experience failures has to do with
cognitive biases. It is suggested by Levin (1988) that there are two standpoints that a
person can take: the “assertoric” gaze and the “aletheic” gaze. If a person takes the
assertoric gaze, they only see things from one perspective, one standpoint, or one position
and therefore tend to be “narrow-minded, dogmatic, inflexible, and unmoved” (Schaller,
2008). If a person takes the aletheic gaze they are more inclusive and therefore tend to be
more “caring, interdependent, and reciprocal” (Schaller, 2008). In the assertoric gaze, the
perspective taken is typically that of one-self – which is the basis for many cognitive
biases. Cognitive biases are flaws in judgments which occur in particular situations as a
result of flawed perception of incoming information. These biases are particularly
prevalent when decision makers have to weigh evidence from many different sources
(Davidow & Levinson, 1993) or face data that is scarce, ambiguous or of low quality
(Tverseky & Kahneman, 1974). Cognitive biases result in reduced objectivity in selection
decisions (Proenca & de Oliveira, 2009), causing decision makers to:
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Be too quick to make a decision and ignore contrary evidence



Be overly zealous in justifying personal decisions



Selectively search for evidence that will support past judgment rather than
objectively evaluating all information

Biases are a way for humans to simplify a complex social world; humans rely on
these heuristics to allow for more efficient information processing, memory, and retrieval
of complicated stimuli humans are faced with on a day-to-day basis (Fiske & Taylor,
1991). If humans considered every single option in any given situation in a day they
would be completely overloaded mentally. Therefore, they succumb to the biases, for the
most part, without even knowing what they are doing. Typically, as proposed by Pipes
(1995), if reality clashes with a person’s wishes, the wishes usually win out (Pipes, 1995).
Cognitive biases are practically impossible for humans to completely avoid altogether.
However, with proper training and understanding, it is possible to understand when an
individual experiences these biases – and then understand how to take steps to alleviate
the experienced bias.
There are countless types of cognitive biases that have been explored in literature,
in businesses, and in the analyst world. Several of these are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4: A small selection of the types of Cognitive Biases related to the Mirror Image Bias.

Bias

Definition

Contrast Bias

Involves making an evaluation based on the standard of the preceding information.
(Petty & Wegener, 1993; Perrin, Barnett & Walrath, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Shapiro
& Spence, 2005)

Anchoring and
Adjustment Bias

Results from decision makers over-relying on a pre-existing anchor, or initial
estimation when making evaluations. (Perrin, Barnett & Walrath, 1993; Strack &
Mussweiler, 1997; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz &
Bergus, 2007)

Order Effects –
Primacy and
Recency Effect

Primacy effect - when information first presented to the person influences the final
judgment more than information presented later during the session. Recency effect information presented later in the session has a greater influence on the final
decision made. (Morgeson & Campion, 2010; Peggy, Wegener & Fabrigar, 1997;

Availability Bias

Results from inaccurately basing the frequency of events on the ease with which
they can be recalled to memory (Morgeson & Campion, 2010; Perrin, Barnett & Walrath,

Confirmation Bias

The tendency to seek evidence to confirm an initial preconception and ignore any
contradictory information. (Dror & Fraser- McKenzie, 2008; Perrin, Barnett & Walrath,

Representativeness
Bias

The tendency of people to judge the degree of relationship between two things based
on their similarity to each other. Also might inadvertently result in stereotyping.

Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Krosnick & Alwin, 1987)

1993; Dube-Rioux & Russo, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973)

1993; Nickerson, 1998; Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney, 1977)

(Morgeson & Campion, 2010; Perrin, Barnett & Walrath, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman,
1973).

Attentional Bias

When someone focuses on one or two choices despite there being other possible
outcomes. (Mather & Carstensen, 2003; Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002; Mogg, Bradley &
Williams, 1995; MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986)

Belief Bias

A bias where people make faulty conclusions based on what they already believe or
know. (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Klauer, Musch & Naumer, 2000; Sá, West &

Conservatism Bias

Where people believe prior evidence more than new evidence or info that has
emerged. (Redlawsk, Civettini & Lau, 2007; Huq, Garety, Hemsley, 1988)
Where people in one state fail to understand people in another state. (Sayette,

Stanovich, 1999; Markovits & Nantel, 1989)

Empathy Gap

Loewenstein, Griffin, Black, 2008; Lowenstein, 2005; Read, Van Leeuwen, 1998; Van
Boven, Dunning, Loewenstein, 2000)

Two biases that are centered on different cultures and beliefs include
Ethnocentrism and the Mirror Imaging Bias. Ethnocentrism is one bias that analysts
might experience. From a sociological viewpoint, Ethnocentrism is a tendency to view
alien groups or cultures from the perspective of one’s own (Ethnocentrism, n.d.). This
type of bias is especially dangerous on a national-security context because it can distort
strategic thinking and result in assumptions that the adversary will behave exactly as one
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might behave (McFate, 2005). Another cognitive bias that analysts experience is the
Mirror Imaging Bias. It is without a doubt the most common error of intelligenceestimating (Pipes, 1995) and frequently results in gross distortions of intelligence and raw
data (Witlin, 2008). Analysts essentially fit the data into a “box” to which it is not suited.
One of the prominent issues that come from the MIB is that it increases analysts’
susceptibility to surprise attacks by adversaries. This is clearly something that needs to be
fixed to be able to minimize the risk to the country.
Fortunately, there are ways to counteract the cognitive biases. “The intelligence
community is aware of the dangers of mirror-imaging. The most effective way to combat
mirror-imaging is supplementing an analyst’s personal experiences… the more training
and experience that can be given to these individuals the less likely they will be to
substitute their own cultural values and perceptions when they encounter informational
gaps” (Witlin, 2008).

MIRROR IMAGING BIAS
The Mirror Imaging Bias, as pointed out earlier, is the most common bias
experienced by intelligence analysts. It is an analyst’s irrational assumption that the
people being studied think and act like the analyst themselves and [the analysts] are
unable to consider variants in the opposing country and culture because they are viewing
the information through the filter of personal experience. Another definition by Richard
Pipes in his paper What to do About the CIA explains the MIB as “the tendency to
interpret the actions of others in one’s own terms. The analyst looks at the situation which
his subject confronts and asks himself: “What would I do if I were in his shoes?” The
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propensity to think in this way derives from a mixture of deficient imagination and,
where other nations are concerned, ethnocentricity” (Pipes, 1995).
This cognitive bias is dangerous. If in a serious enough situation, where lives are
potentially in danger – as they were in 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, or other examples that were
listed above – the MIB can prove to be fatal. When the analyst says to themselves “What
would I do if I were in his shoes,” they put their own perspectives and background rather
than taking into consideration the perspectives and background of the adversary. This in
turn undermines objectivity (Witlin, 2008). A warning from Frank Wantabe states that
“simply because something is logical doesn’t mean that the subject being analyzed will
see it that way” (Witlin, 2008). When differences in thought processes and beliefs are
taken into consideration, it almost seems obvious that the analyzers viewpoint is not the
same as that of the person being analyzed.
Within literature, there are many viewpoints on why the MIB occurs within
analysts. While the MIDAS group believes it is a standalone cognitive bias, there are still
others that think that it comes along with other biases. These pairings can be broken
down into three sections: the failure of Theory of Mind, a racial bias, and mindreading.
FIRST POTENTIAL CAUSE OF MIB: FAILURE OF THEORY OF MIND
The Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute mental states – beliefs,
intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. – to oneself and others and to understand that
others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one's own (Call &
Tomasello, 2008). ToM expresses itself in the TPJ (temporal parietal junction), which is
important in making the distinction between self and other. For example it allows a
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person to be able to answer the question: Did I generate this action or did I merely
observe the action of the other? (van der Meer, Groenwold, Nolen, Pijnenbork, Aleman,
2011). Figure 1 shows the distinction between MIB and ToM.

Attempt to predict another's behavior
You predict what
YOU would do

You predict what
THEY would do

MIB

ToM

Figure 1: MIB is when you predict what you would do when analyzing and predicting another persons’
behavior whereas ToM is when you predict what the other person would do.

Research has shown that young subjects, in comparison with adults, are less
capable to perform ToM tasks (van der Meer et al., 2011). Before their brain is
completely developed and before they are concerned with other people, and even other
cultures, they are unable to understand the difference between their beliefs and others’
beliefs. Development of ToM is between the ages of 3 and 5 (Nickerson, 1999). Another
study by Tamm, Menon, & Reiss (2002) investigated brain maturation in relation to
response inhibition. The results showed a positive correlation between activation in the
left Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) and age. This showed that younger subjects were not as
good at ToM tasks (Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002; van der Meer et al., 2011).
As with many other cognitive biases, ToM entails more than one step. Van der
Meer has explained that the Theory of Mind, in two parts, involves 1) inhibition of one’s
own perspective, which leads into 2) belief reasoning. The first, inhibition of one’s own
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perspective, may well be a necessary feature of perspective taking according to van der
Meer (van der Meer et al., 2011).
The first part of Theory of Mind, inhibition of one’s own perspective, is known by
several different names: empathic accuracy and knowledge imputation. Empathic
accuracy is a person’s ability to accurately infer the specific content of another person’s
thoughts and feelings (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, Teng, 1995). “Empathically accurate
perceivers are those who are consistently good at “reading” other people’s thoughts and
feelings. All else being equal they are likely to be the most tactful advisors, the most
diplomatic officials, the most effective negotiators, the most electable politicians, the
most productive salespersons, the most successful teachers, and the most insightful
therapists” (Nickerson, 1999). Imputation is a noun that is the act of imputing – saying or
suggesting that someone or something has or is guilty of something - as an attribution,
accusation, and insinuation (imputation, n.d.). Knowledge imputation, therefore, is the
attribution, accusation or insinuation that someone has knowledge of something, whether
or not they actually do in reality. “It seems clear that the imputation of knowledge to
others may be done with different degrees of awareness. One may impute some
knowledge (e.g., the knowledge that Wednesday follows Tuesday,) automatically without
being conscious of doing so; in other cases, one may impute knowledge as a consequence
of a thought process of which one is very much aware (e.g., “She undoubtedly knows of
who wrote Middlemarch, because she is very interested in the English Literature”)”
(Nickerson, 1999).
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One term for the failure of inhibition, which in turn can help us understand the
success of inhibition, is called Egocentrism. According to Jean Piaget, egocentrism is an
inability on the part of a child in the preoperational stage of development to see any point
of view other than their own (“Egocentrism,” n.d.). This concept doesn’t necessarily have
to only pertain to children – it can be extended to all others who have a failure to
understand beyond their own point of view. In children, egocentrism isn’t shown in more
errors of social judgment. Instead it shows itself in the fact that they make one particular
kind of error: attributing their own knowledge, viewpoint, feelings, etc to others (Shantz,
1983; Nickerson, 1999). Egocentrism is when people don’t set aside their own
perspective when adopting another’s but instead use [their own perspective] as a starting
point, or judgmental anchor (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, Gilovich, 2004). This
‘egocentric assumption’ was first suggested by Fenigstein and Abrams (1993).
Individuals whose heads are tilted will judge straight lines as tilted if they are
simultaneously distracted but will recognize the biasing influence of their tilted head and
identify the line as straight if they are not distracted (Epley et al., 2004). In the absence of
compelling, identifiable reasons for some other assumption, the best default assumption
one can make regarding another’s knowledge on a particular subject is arguably one’s
own knowledge of that subject (Nickerson, 1999). These misapprehensions potentially
are grounded in a tendency to impute one’s own perspective to others (Ruby & Decety,
2003). To fix this tendency, a dimension of cognitive flexibility must be added in order to
assess others’ states of mind accurately (Ruby & Decety, 2003).
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The second part of Theory of Mind, belief reasoning, is the reasoning about
mental states like beliefs, desires and intentions in an attempt to explain, predict, and
manipulate human behavior (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, Samson, 2006). Saxe
et al. (2004) suggests that belief reasoning must meet two criteria: generality and
specificity. He points out that “First, the candidate region must show increased activity
to any stimuli that invite the attribution of beliefs, both true and false. Second, the
response must be specific to belief attribution” (Saxe, Carey, Kanwisher, 2004). Belief
reasoning is an everyday behavior that is argued to be automatic (Friedman & Leslie,
2004; Sperber & Wilson, 2002; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998). “It is unknown
whether [the belief reasoning] is made automatically when people attend to the behavior
of agents, or whether such inferences are made ad hoc, according to need” (Apperly,
Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, Samson, 2006). As with many of the other cognitive biases,
belief reasoning – considering other peoples beliefs and desires – is a way to simplify a
situation that might otherwise be difficult to understand.
The typical formats for tests on belief reasoning in humans are described as
follows. These can be seen in action through experiments by Sommer et al. (2007), Birch
and Bloom (2007), and van der Meer (2011). There are a series of images or videos that
show a “story” of what is going on in a room. Specifically in the experiment by Sommer
et al. (2007) the first set of pictures show a girl and a boy in a room with two boxes. The
girl takes a toy that is lying on the floor and places it in container #2 and then leaves the
room. There are two separate cases: true belief, and false belief. In the true belief case,
the boy takes the toy out of container #2 and is holding it when the girl re-enters the
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room. He then places it in container #1 while the girl is watching. In the false belief case,
the boy takes the toy out of container #2 and places it in container #1 while the girl is out
of the room. The girl then re-enters the room. A question is then asked as to where the
girl thinks the toy is. In the true belief case, the expected response is that the girl will
think the toy is in container #1 because the girl saw the boy switch the toys location in
front of her. Therefore the unexpected (false) response would be the girl thinking the toy
is in container #2 even though the toy, in reality, is in container #1. In the false belief
case, after being asked the same question, the expected response is that the girl will think
the toy is still in container #2 because she didn’t see the boy switch the toys location. The
unexpected (false) response is that the girl the girl thinks the toy is in container #1 even
though she didn’t see the boy switch the toys location.
These sorts of experiments are normally only done with the false belief case, but
Sommer et al. chose to consider the other side in the true belief case. Similarly, these
belief reasoning experiments have been run with both adults and children. Adults seem to
be able to use belief reasoning in their everyday lives easily. However, children have a
more difficult time understanding complex mental states. The cutoff, as suggested by
Kovács (2009) is around the age of 4. Before then, children are normally unable to
understand any viewpoints besides their own (Kovács, 2009). “Younger children fail on
ToM tasks because they cannot reason about complex mental states, such as beliefs
(Perner, 1991 via Kovács, 2009). If so, successful performance on false-belief tasks
reflects the emergence of an understanding of others (and oneself) in terms of mental
conditions” (Kovács, 2009). Responses from experiments show whether the participant is
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capable of belief reasoning – if they follow the expected response – or not – if they
follow the unexpected response.
SECOND POTENTIAL CAUSE OF MIB: CULTURAL BIAS
“Most of our misunderstandings of other people are not due to any
inability to hear them or to parse their sentences or to understand their
words ...A far more important source of difficulty in communication is that
we so often fail to understand a speaker's intention.”(Miller, 1974, as
found in Thomas, 1983, p. 91)
The second potential cause of the Mirror Imaging Bias is due to a cultural bias in
the person. It is clear that each culture, and even further - each person, has different
beliefs and experiences. “When, in daily human interactions, persons have reflected back
to them not themselves but the cultural assumptions of others, they experience a failed
mirroring. Thus, failed mirroring is not merely an interpersonal interaction; it is a cultural
phenomenon when societal representations are assumed and projected” (Schaller, 2008).
Further, the mindset of the analyst tends to take over when hard evidence runs out
(Heuer, 1999). This fact indicates that American analysts tend to project “American
values and conceptual frameworks onto the foreign leaders and societies, rather than
understanding the logic of the situation” (Heuer, 1999, p. 12). This cultural bias –
thinking that “everybody thinks like us” – is completely falsified. People in other cultures
do not think the same way that we do.
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THIRD POTENTIAL CAUSE OF MIB: MINDREADING
The third potential cause of the Mirror Imaging Bias is through a cognitive action
known as Mindreading. This action is the activity of representing specific mental states of
others, for example, their perceptions, goals, beliefs, expectations, and the like (Gallese &
Goldman, 1998). There are two predominant approaches when researching this subject:
theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). The TT explains that ordinary people
accomplish mindreading by acquiring and deploying commonsense theory of mind,
something akin to a scientific theory (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). ST suggests that
attributors use their own mental mechanisms to calculate and predict the mental processes
of others (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). The core difference between TT and ST,
according to Gallese and Goldman (1998), is that TT depicts mindreading as thoroughly
‘detached’ theoretical activity, whereas ST depicts mindreading as incorporating an
attempt to replicate, mimic, or impersonate the mental life of the target agent (Gallese
and Goldman, 1998).
Baron-Cohen (1995) explains mindreading as the “cognitive ability to represent
the psychological states (perceptions, emotions, intentions, desires, beliefs, etc.) of
oneself and others” (Jacob, 2008). If the consideration of self is included in mindreading,
it is possible to think that another person would act as you would - which would be a
representation of the Mirror Imaging Bias - rather than just taking into consideration what
the other person would do in reality. Mindreading, therefore, is “essentially a motor
phenomenon of action synchronization, not inference” (Pineda, 2009). In the brain,
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Mindreading activates areas such as the medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal
junction. (Pineda, 2009)
Mindreading not only pulls from the ability to represent feelings or emotions to
another, it also deals with the cognition of sentences or passages of information.
Depending on how they are viewed or presented can completely change the context and
therefore perception of the information. This concept pulls in many of the related
cognitive biases previously mentioned that deal with the perception of facts and
knowledge. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration how a person would look
at the knowledge and how they might present it in different situations.
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RESEARCH COMPONENTS
Hofstede’s country classification scale was used to decide which cultures to use in
the stimuli for the experiment. “Hofstede's (1980) study is one of the most frequently
cited research efforts regarding the relationship between national culture and workrelated values (Bhagat & McQuaid, 1982 via Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, & Nicholson,
1997). His research has been instrumental in furthering an understanding of cross-cultural
management theory and practice, revealing that members of different societies hold
divergent values concerning the nature of organizations and interpersonal relationships
within them” (Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, & Nicholson, 1997). Hofstede’s cultural
contrasts have standard scores for each culture. These scores were used in order to choose
which cultures to include in the testing stimuli. Those with scores the most different from
U.S. were considered to be different enough from our cultures viewpoint to be able to test
for a significant difference in opinion on these dimensions: Individualism vs.
Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity vs. Femininity, and Power Distance.
Table 5 shows some standard scores found by Hofstede and used in our study.
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Table 5: Cultural Contrast Standard Scores (Fernandez et al., 1997). Those with a significant difference
from U.S. scores were countries and contrasts that were included in our experiment.

Individualism vs. Collectivism
U.S.
Russia
China
Japan

1.52
-1.89
-0.96
-0.53
Uncertainty Avoidance

U.S.
Mexico
Germany
Japan

0.59
-1.2
-1.16
-0.81
Masculinity vs. Femininity

U.S.
China
Mexico
Japan

-0.58
2.2
0.62
0.42
Power Distance

U.S.

-0.01

Each image used in the experiment was tested through the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS) rating scale to ensure consistency. The IAPS was “developed to
provide a set of normative emotional stimuli for experimental investigators of emotion
and attention … The existence of these collections of normatively rated affective stimuli
should: 1) allow better experimental control in the selection of emotional stimuli, 2)
facilitate the comparison of results across different studies conducted in the same or
different laboratory, and 3) encourage and allow exact replications within and across
research labs who are assembling basic and applied problems in psychological science”
(Lang, Bradley, Cuthbert, 1999). Although their images were not used, the scale was used
to make certain that the images were all of the same approximate rating – this ensured
that no images were statistically any different than the others.
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VISUAL MEASURES
In terms of the visual measures, this section will be broken down further into the
different types that will be collected as well as how they could potentially relate to the
cognitive workload of the human. Each of these measures will be collected and analyzed
through the Tobii eye tracking system.
FIXATIONS AND SACCADES

Fixations, or a fixation point, is “the point in the visual field that is fixated by the
two eyes in normal vision and for each eye is the point that directly stimulates the fovea
of the retina” (fixation point, n.d.). In other words it is a point in which both eyes focus
for a certain period of time. On the other hand, a saccade is a “small rapid jerky
movement of the eye especially as it jumps from fixation on one point to another”
(saccade, n.d.).
Liversedge and Findlay (2000) researched the use of saccades in visual search and
reading to see if it could be related to cognitive processes. Although they didn’t come to a
specific conclusion on a direct correlation, they did note the importance of fixations in
understanding cognitive processes. They argued that “deciding where and when to move
the point of fixation are key aspects of eye-movement control and that understanding the
relationship between the two is necessary to understand fully the cognitive processes
reflected by eye movements” (Liversedge & Findlay, 2000, p. 12). A study by Loftus and
Mackworth (1978) on visual search patterns in a picture, found that the fact that
“observers fixate earlier, more often, and with longer durations on objects that have a low
probability of appearing in a scene” implies that cognitive factors play a role in peripheral
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visual processing (Loftus & Mackworth, 1978, p. 565). Another study by Just and
Carpenter (1978) looked at visual patterns of rotation detection and found that as the
tasks became harder, and therefore more cognitively involved, that people gaze at the
figures for much longer (Just & Carpenter, 1978).
BLINK RATE AND PUPIL DIAMETER
Blink rate is the number of times per minute that a person closes their eyes and
the pupil diameter is the length of the pupil from side to side. A study by Bentivoglio,
Bressman, Cassetta, Carretta, Tonali, & Albanese (1997) looked at blink rate in relation
to a reading task that required mental and visual concentration. They found that blink rate
decreased during reading and increased during conversation. In a study by Siegle,
Ichikawa, and Steinhauer that crosses over the concepts of both blink rate and pupil
diameter in relation to information processing, found that blinks flank periods of change
in cognitive load as well as that there were a burst of blinks peaking before the pupillary
response (Siegle, Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008). Again, this study showed that as the
peak pupil dilation is delayed from neural and muscular activity, blinks may precede
cognitive load. Similarly, they found that “sustained cognitive load was accompanied by
sustained pupil dilation but not sustained blinks” (Siegle et al. 2008, p. 684).
GAZE PATTERNS AND HEAT MAPS
Gaze patterns are the paths that a persons’ eye travels while viewing a picture or
scene in their visual path. Heat maps are a way to analyze how frequently a person looks
at a certain area in comparison to other areas. Henderson, in a research article on gaze
control, points out that eye movement is “smart” because it not only draws on currently
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available visual information, but also on several cognitive systems like short term
memory, long term visual, special and semantic information, and also goals and plans of
the viewer (Henderson, 2003). Although there is very little research done on how these
factors can correlate to cognitive activities, it is extremely interesting to see what in a
particular picture draws a persons’ attention. An example of a heat map on an image can
be seen in Figure 2. Areas of the heat map that are red are frequented more often than
areas with no color at all.

Figure 2: An example of a heat map when a participant views a picture shows that several areas of the
picture attract more attention than others.

PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES
The term cognitive load is used to refer to the load that performing a particular
task imposes on the person’s cognitive system (Paas et al., 1994; found in Nourbakhsh,
2012). It has extremely profound impacts on many aspects of human life including, but
not limited to: learning (Sweller, 1994), safety in driving (Engstrom, Johansson, &
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Östlund, 2005), aviation (Huttunen, Keränen, Väyrynen, Pääkkönen, & Leino, 2011;
Wilson, 2002), and user interface design (Saadé & Otrakji, 2007). Cognitive overload
often leads to performance reduction and errors that in some cases such as air traffic
control can have serious consequences (Nourbakhsh, 2012). Five forms of physiological
measures were collected from participants during the experiment: galvanic skin response
(GSR), heart rate variance (HRV), respiration, skin temperature, electromyography
(EMG(F)) of the medial frontalis, and right-unilateral EMG(E) of the orbicularis oculi.
Each of these will be outlined and related to cognitive workload in this section.
GALVANIC SKIN RESPONSE (GSR)
Many studies have explored the relationship between the Galvanic Skin Response
(GSR) and cognitive load. GSR data is collected by attaching one or two sensors to the
skin of the subject, typically to the index and middle finger pads, and is measured in
micro Siemens. In the MIDAS Tobii study, two CAPTIV GSR sensors are attached to the
middle and index finger pads to measure the electrical conductance of the skin.
Many studies have looked into GSR and what it means for cognitive load. Landis
and Hunt (as found in Mundy-Castle, 1953) concluded that it may indicate change of
direction of mental activity, but not a direct measure. Another study by van der Merwe
and Theron (1947) to study the “value of the Groetz finger plethsymograph in measuring
emotional stability” found a positive correlation between rates of change in finger pulse
volume [which is an early measurement of GSR] and emotional liability; which supports
the claim that GSR is associated with emotion (Van der Merwe, Theron, 1947, p. 109).
Mundy-Castle and McKiever didn’t find any significant correlation between
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psychophysiological data and GSR in a study with harsh-audio stimuli to see if
“individual differences in GSR adaptation rate are related to a temperamental factor
underlying differences in excitatory/inhibitory balance”, they did find that there was
significance between age and GSR (Mundy-Castle and McKiever, 1953, p. 16).
“The association between GSR groups and age immediately suggests that
stability may be a function of maturity; there is increasing evidence to
show that there are centers for autonomic control in the frontal cortex”
(Mundy-Castle, McKiever, 1953, p. 22).
Another study by Tarankar et.al (2013) showed that GSR and respiratory
responses are relatable and correlated to each other. (Turankar et al., 2011). Nourbakhsh,
Want, Chen, & Calvo (2012) found that there was a correlation between GSR and
cognitive load measurement in a study on text reading tasks and arithmetic tasks.
Nourbakhsh, Wang & Chen (2013) furthered their previous study to see if there was any
correlation between blink rate, GSR, and cognitive load. They found that both are good
detectors of how mentally involved people are. The higher the GSR frequency, the more
mentally involved a subject is as well as the lower a persons’ blink rate, the more
mentally involved they are. What’s more, the combination of blink number and GSR
frequency power resulted in the highest classification accuracies (Nourbakhsh, Want,
Chen, 2013). However, they did mention that since there are differences from person to
person, the GSR rating must be calibrated. They used the following equation:

𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗) =
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𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗)
1 𝑚
∑
𝑚 𝑗=1 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑖, 𝑗)

Where m is the number of tasks. This equation essentially normalizes the data by
dividing each individual data-point by the mean rating of the entire study. Shi, Ruiz,
Taib, Choi, & Chen (2007) did a similar study to look at the correlation of GSR to stress
level and found that as a person becomes more or less stressed, the GSR increases or
decreases respectively (Shi, Ruiz, Taib, Choi, Chen, 2007). They analyzed their data by
using a mean GSR value for each stimuli and followed up with an ANOVA test to see if
there was a correlation. As the difficulty of the task increased, the GSR value increased.
Conway, Dick, Wang, & Chen (2013) used a similar method to normalize the GSR
values in order to analyze the mean ratings for their stimuli set (Conway, Dick, Wang, &
Chen, 2013). For the purposes of this study, a normalized mean GSR value for each
stimuli was used to compare between participants.
HEART RATE VARIANCE (HRV)
Heart rate, measured in beats per minute, is the rate at which the heart beats.
Using the CAPTIV system, the heart rate is measured by a thoracic belt. Heart rate
variability (HRV), therefore, measures the interplay between sympathetic and
parasympathetic influences on heart rate (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006).
Heart rate, in a study on driving mannerisms by Mehler, Reimer, Coughlin, &
Dusek (2009) showed that average heart rate increased as cognitive task demands
increased (Mehler, Reimer, Coughlin & Dusek, 2009). In a study by Hansen, Johnsen, &
Thayer (2009) to see if there was a correlation between HRV and anxiety, stress, &
coping found that there was a correlation between high HRV and good performance on
cognitive function tasks (Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2009). A study by Huysamen,
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Göbel, & Davy (1998) completed a study to compare HRV to different cognitive tasks,
the complexity of those tasks, as well as the time of day the task was completed. It was
found that memory tasks showed the highest HRV values and heart rate frequency values
(Huysamen, Göbel, & Davy, 2013).
While this information is useful, the HRV data collected was unreliable, so this
relation will not be explored in analysis.
RESPIRATION
Respiration, through the CAPTIV system is measured as a percentage of how
much a person has inhaled or exhaled. Respiration rate, however, is the rate at which a
person inhales or exhales; essentially breaths per minute. In the study, previously
mentioned, by Mehler et al (2009) it showed that as cognitive task demands increased,
respiration rate also increased (Mehler et al., 2009). Another study by Novak, Mihelj, &
Munih (2011) explained that mean respiration rate decreases as cognitive workload
increases, but increases again as the challenge becomes too much to handle (Novak,
Mihelj, & Munih, 2011, p. 7). Due to technical restraints in analysis, this measurement
will not be explored for the purposes of this project.
SKIN TEMPERATURE
Temperature is what it sounds like: the outside temperature of a human. It is
typically gathered by placing a thermometer sensor on the wrist on top of one of the main
blood carrying veins. Through CAPTIV, it is measured in degrees Celsius, which can be
easily transferred over to degrees Fahrenheit if needed. In the previously mentioned study
by Novak et al. (2011) they found that temperature might be a good indicator of when a
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subject is overworked (Novak et al., 2011). Another study by Or and Duffy (2007)
looked into skin temperature in a driving simulator in order to detect a change in mental
workload. They found that there was a relation of temperature drop to an increase of
mental workload (Or & Duffy, 2007).
As with the HRV, while this information is useful, the temperature data collected
was unreliable, so this relation will also not be explored in analysis. All methods not
measured in this project will be explored in the future.
ELECTROMYOGRAPHY (EMG)
Electromyography (EEG/EMG) is collected through sensors placed on the skin
surface; specifically they will be placed on the right temporal area as well as the forehead
and is measured with microvolts. They measure the electrical activity of muscles at rest
and during contraction. It has been found that increases in slow-wave EEG have been
associated with decreased alertness (Wright & McGown, 2001). A study by Wilson,
Caldwell, and Russell (2007) found that “with regard to physiological correlates of task
performance, the EEG and heart-rate measures collected during the experiment were
highly correlated with the performance effects” (Wilson, Caldwell, & Russell, 2007).
Therefore, average EMG can be used to quantify muscle activity over time.
Root mean square is a method recommended quantification by Basmajian and
DeLuca (1985) and is calculated by squaring each data point, summing the squares,
dividing the sum by the number of observations, and then taking the square root. This
number represents 0.707 of one half of the peak to peak value (Basmajian & De Luca,
1985). However, average EMG can also be used as a quantification of the muscle activity
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over time. A comparison of one participants data using both Root Mean Square and
Average of the EMG data-points show that each essentially show the same thing, at a
different ratio. The EMG of the medial frontalis can be seen in Figure 3 and shows the
same trend (r2 = 0.9688). The right-unilateral EMG(E) of the orbicularis oculi
comparison between RMS and Average EMG can be seen in Figure 4 shows the same
trend (r2 = 0.9688). Based on these comparisons, the average of the EMG will be used for

analysis.
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Figure 3: Comparison shows that AVG EMG on the forehead shows the same trend (r2 = 0.9688) as RMS
data, simply at a different ratio.
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Figure 4: Comparison shows that AVG EMG on the temple shows the same trend (r^2 = 0.9586) as RMS
data, simply at a different ratio.
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III.

METHODOLOGY

Two outside factors were taken into consideration in our experiment:
individualism and cultural differences. Individualism, or the fact that each person has
their own distinct existence – their own beliefs, experiences, and personalities, was
accounted for through pre and post questionnaires. These can be seen in Appendix A and
B, respectively. If individuality was not accounted for, the test would have assumed that
each participant was of the same viewpoint, experiences, beliefs, and personalities. This
assumption would have been completely irrational and non-realistic because, as pointed
out earlier, each person has their own individualities. Each tiny difference could
potentially be a reason why they would exhibit the MIB. Cultural considerations were
also accounted for. As with the last factor, if these were not included the experiment
would have been non-realistic. Each culture has a set of their own beliefs and experiences
that, theoretically, every person that is a part of the culture adheres to. Similarly, each
culture has a set of stereotypes and biases that are assumed by other cultures (for
example, All Americans are wasteful, or all Chinese children are great at math) whether
or not they are actually correct. Through a partial knowledge of other cultures, people
assume that they can understand and think like the other cultures. To analyze these
cultural differences in the data, we asked questions about each person’s viewpoint to their
own culture as well as their thoughts about other cultures in the pre and post
questionnaire (ex. In the images, did the persons’ race play a role in your answers?)
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The first task in building the experimental stimuli was selecting what cultures to
present. It was decided to use China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and Russia. As presented
earlier, Hofstede’s country classification scale was used as a reference point of standard
scores for other cultures. From these standard scores, the topics were chosen for the
stimuli. Power distance was excluded because the U.S. scores fall on the mean. The
breakdown of topics can be seen in Figure 5. The individual topics are broken down into
the three categories taken from Hofstede’s scores – each of them fitting within the higher
topic (i.e. letting others share falls under individualism vs. collectivism because some
cultures are more focused around sharing/collectivism while others prefer to not
share/individualism).

Individualism
VS.
Collectivism

• Assuming Responsibility
• Letting others share
• Sacrificing
• Valuing group success
• Importance of group
inclusion

• Meetings are more efficient
when run by men
• More important for males to
have career
Masculine
VS.
• Men solve problems with
Feminine
logic vs. intuition
• Men solve problems with
dominant approach
• Pick men as leaders
• Prefer unstructured situations
• Prefer broad guidelines
• Not stressed when outcomes
Uncertainty
cannot be predidcted
Avoidance
• Take risks when outcomes
cannot be predicted
• Rules should not be broken
for mere pragmatic reasons

Figure 5: Hofstede's country classification aided in deciding topics for the experiments stimuli. Each of the
three topics were broken down into five sub-topics.

Each sub-topic was explored with four different stimuli, totaling 60 images.
Participants were exposed to each culturally relevant image with an accompanying audio
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segment, and two questions. The audio segment was a non-U.S., culturally relevant
statement about a single person. Each audio segment averaged 5 seconds, but none went
over eight seconds or under four seconds. Each image included a single person or group
of people of a single culture. There were an equal amount of stimuli about males and
females; 30 stimuli for each gender. An image was displayed for eight seconds while the
audio file played. The image was removed after the audio had completed. Participants
were to then answer a question regarding if the person in the image would do a certain
activity that centered on one of Hofstede’s topics.
The questions were formulated from half positive and negative perspectives.
Each image was presented twice, to carefully explore MIB and ToM. The first was a
question about the others actions, and the second was a question about self. Since both
MIB and ToM occur when judging or predicting the actions of a third party (i.e. how the
person in the image would act) it was important to compare the difference between the
answers (self vs. other). Participants responded to questions–yes or no by left or right
clicking a computer mouse. Image order was randomized to minimize a learning effect.
Figure 6 illustrates the order of each stimulus. A sample image can be seen in Figure 7.
Similarly, the question presented to the participant from the “other” perspective are
shown in Figure 8 and the “self” perspective in Figure 9. Appendix C includes all stimuli
used in the experiment.
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Figure 6: The order of each stimuli began with an image and a non-US culturally relevant statement about
the person in the image and then moved into a question on the screen regarding what the person in the
image is likely to do. Later a question about what the participant would be likely to do appeared on the
screen.

Figure 7: An example of an image shown in the experiment. This particular image is of a Russian woman.
The stimuli audio and question would reflect something that her culture would experience.

Figure 8: In the “other” stimuli linked to Petrova’s image it suggests that her family happened to have a
quality crop even though there was a severe drought. The question about "other" asked the participant if
they thought Petrova would share her crop with other farmers.

Figure 9: In the “self” stimuli linked to Petrova’s image it again suggests that her family happened to have
a quality crop even though there was a severe drought. The he question about "self" asked the participant
if they would share their crop in a similar situation.
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As mentioned earlier, each image was tested through the IAPS rating scale; eight
participants provided results. The images were mapped according to a subjective rating
on a scale of 1 to 9 of both valence (happiness/unhappiness), where 1 was completely
unhappy and 9 was completely happy, and arousal (relaxed/stimulated), where 1 was
completely unaroused and 9 was completely aroused. These ratings were then averaged
through the different participants and graphed with arousal on the x-axis and valence on
the y-axis. Ideally, the ratings would be around the center of the graph or in the third
quadrant – a rating of 5 or less for both valence and arousal – the results of the IAPS test
can be seen in Figure 10. The IAPS rating was completed so that any physiological
reaction from participants can be attributed to whether or not the person reacted
according to MIB presented and not because of the image. Since all the stimuli were
around the same area, this proves that results were because of the personal biases, not
because of the impression of the image.
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Figure 10: Results of the IAPS rating test on the images show that all the images used in the experiment
were of approximately the same rating. This showed that results from the experiment were due to
emotional, or bias, reasons and not due to a reaction to the images.
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Testing of the stimuli was done through a Tobii Studio eye tracker system at
Wright State University (WSU). The study was approved by the WSU Institutional
Review Board (IRB) and the Surgeon General (SG). The Tobii Studio eye tracker collects
gaze data with a sampling rate of 120 Hz from an off body camera located on a stationary
monitor. It was used in conjunction with the Captiv-L7000 system which collected six
physiological measures: galvanic skin response (GSR), heart rate variance (HRV),
respiration, skin temperature, electromyography (EMG) of the medial frontalis, and rightunilateral EMG of the orbicularis oculi.
The study used a randomization scheme for the stimuli set presented to each
participant. Fifteen participants from the ages of 21 to 50 were pulled from the Wright
State University community. Each participant went through each of the 60 stimuli twice –
once to ask how the person in the images would act (referred to as “other”) and another
time to ask how the participants would act in the situation (referred to as “self”). The
distinction between the answer for how the other person would act versus how the
participant would act in a situation shows the Mirror Imaging Bias. The timeline that
each participant experienced during the Tobii experiment is shown in Figure 11. Each run
of the experiment lasted a little under an hour (give or take).
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Figure 11: The timeline for each run of the experiment began with an informed consent and prequestionnaire. It then lead into the attaching of the physiological sensors and calibration of the eyetracker. Each of the stimuli were presented in groups of ten. Once all the stimuli were observed, then the
sensors were removed and a post-questionnaire was administered. The entire process took a little under
an hour.

Answers provided by the participant (either yes or no) were recorded and
analyzed. Since both MI and ToM occur when judging or predicting the actions of a third
party (i.e. how the person in the image would act) it was important to compare the
difference between the answers (self vs. other). MI is the irrationality in which a person
perceives and processes information through the filter of personal experience. If the
participant is experiencing MI while answering how the person in the image would act,
they would instead answer how they would act in the similar situation. Essentially you
predict what you would do. Therefore, the tendency and susceptibility for MIB is the
prevalence or frequency that the participant takes their own perspective when attempting
to judge a third party. Again, since susceptibility is the percentage of judgments made
that correspond to the participants own viewpoint, it is critical to determine what the
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participants viewpoint is. In contrast, ToM is the ability to predict and interpret the
thoughts and actions of another by taking on their perspective. In the experiment, this
would be shown by the participant answering the question of how would the person in the
image act correctly – from their viewpoint. You predict what they would do.
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IV.

RESULTS

GENERAL RESULTS
Overall results show that individuals exhibited MIB statistically more frequently
(p = 0.0006, m. = 40.13%, s.d. = 8.57%) than ToM (m = 21.23%, s.d. = 8.32%). A
comparison can be seen in Figure 12.

Bias Enticement
PERCENTAGE OF TRIALS

100
80
60
40
20
0
TOM

MIB

Figure 12: MIB was enticed almost twice as much as ToM.

MIB was observed greater in stimuli about females (m. = 48.44%, s.d. = 9.74%)
compared to stimuli about males (m. = 32.66%, s.d. = 7.98%). This comparison can be
seen in Figure 13. On a similar note, questions about the different cultures resulted in a
wide range of MIB enticement, with questions about Germans eliciting the highest (m. =
64.76%, s.d. = 14.15%) and questions about China eliciting the lowest (m. = 33.81%, s.d.
= 12.51%). The different culture comparisons can be seen in Figure 14.
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Figure 13: Questions about females resulted in more susceptibility to MIB compared to males.

Culture Enticement of MIB
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Figure 14: Questions about Germans elicited the most amount of MIB.

Delving further into the susceptibility of participants within each different
Hofstede’s country classification topic; the bias was shown most frequently in
Uncertainty Avoidance (m. = 49.00%, s.d. = 11.98%), followed by Masculinity vs
Femininity (m. = 37.33%, s.d. = 11.31%) and closely shadowed by Individualism vs.
Collectivism (m. = 35.33%, s.d. = 12.74%). This can be seen in Figure 15. Within each of
these main topics were sub-topics which can be seen in Figure 16. Full titles of the topics
can be referenced from Figure 5: Hofstede’s country classification. The “not stressed
when outcomes can’t be predicted” category had the highest amount of MIB at 65.00%
(s.d. = 31.05) while the “Men solve problems with logic vs. intuition” category had the
least amount of MIB at 20% (s.d. = 19.3).
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Topic Enticement of MIB
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Figure 15: Uncertainty Avoidance showed the most amount of MIB in a comparison of each of the topics
from Hofstede’s Country Classification Scale.
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Figure 16: Highest MIB was shown in the “Not stressed when outcomes cannot be predicted” sub-topic.

Participants were asked what their biggest influence was when unsure about
answers. The responses fell under the following categories: gut feeling, facial expression
or demeanor of the person, the assumption that they would do the “right thing,” the
assumption that the person in the image would do the same thing as the participant, and
the assumption that the person in the image would follow their respective cultural cues.
The latter two are key: MIB is the assumption that another person would act the same
way as you, and ToM is understanding that another person can take an opposing
viewpoint. Participants who reported answering questions from the stimuli’s culture—by
definition ToM—exhibited MIB more so than participants who reported the stimuli
individual would act as the participant would—by definition MIB. This result is contrary
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to the current paradigm and exemplifies the complexity and criticalness of cultural
viewpoints. Similarly, it shows that those who are susceptible to the bias, are so
unknowingly.
Participants were also asked if the culture of the individuals or groups affected
their responses. Most of the people responded that yes, it did play a role in their response;
Figure 17. This supports the hypothesis that culture plays a role in MIB because such a
large portion of the participants answered according to culture.

Figure 17: Based on the results from a post-questionnaire topic, it shows that culture played a large role in
the responses that participants gave.

RESPONSE TIME
A t-test indicated no significance between the levels (MIB/ToM) with respect to
response time (p = 0.1133). However, a t-test for one participant revealed a significant
effect - response time was lower for MIB compared to ToM (p = 0.0141). Response time
for each participant with respect to MIB and ToM can be seen in Figure 18. For 11
participants– a t-test revealed a significant effect with respect to response time of the self
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vs. other viewpoints. In all cases, the question worded in the viewpoint of self exhibited a
response time less than questions worded in the viewpoint of other. Response times for
each participant with respect to other and self can be seen in Figure 19. P-values that
showed significance for the t-tests for each participant can be seen in Table 6. Participant
102 had unusable data and therefore had to be excluded from analysis.

Figure 18, left: A LS Means Plot to compare response time of each participant according to MIB and ToM
shows that there is a general trend that MIB response time is less than ToM response time.
Figure 19, right: A LS Means Plot to compare response time of each participant according to viewpoint
shows that the response time of questions about “self” is drastically lower than the response time for
questions about “other”.

56

Table 6: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for response time. One participant had a
significant difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to response time. 11 of the participants
showed significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to response time.
Participant
101
103
104
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Compare
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time
Response Time
Response Time
Response Time
Response Time

Significance
P = 0.4970
P = 0.0069*
P = 0.1927
P = 0.0043*
P = 0.0141*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P = 0.0553

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.1628

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P = 0.0262*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.3842

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P < 0.0001*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.6932

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P = 0.0250*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.0998

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P < 0.0001*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.9425

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P = 0.0013*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.1152

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P < 0.0001*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.6578

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P < 0.0001*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.7745

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P = 0.0976

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.4972

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P = 0.2863

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.6421

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P = 0.0040*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Response Time

P = 0.3240

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Response Time

P = 0.0039*

NUMBER OF FIXATIONS
An ANOVA and t-test showed no significance between MIB and TOM responses
when comparing responses between all participants (p = 0.9519). However, when
comparing MIB and TOM responses within each participant, one participant showed a
significant effect (p = 0.0109): MIB had a higher number of fixations compared to ToM.
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A LS Means Plot that displays number of fixations for each participant with respect to
MIB and ToM can be seen below in Figure 20. Seven participants had a significant
difference between the number of fixations for questions about other vs. self. A LS
Means Plot that displays number of fixations for all participants with respect to other and
self can be seen below; Figure 21. P-values that showed significance for the t-tests for
each participant can be seen in Table 7. One participant had unusable data and therefore
had to be excluded from analysis.

Figure 20, left: A LS Means Plot to compare number of fixations for each participant according to MIB and
ToM did not show any general trend. This is reflected in the t-test which showed no significance in the
difference between number of fixations for MIB and ToM responses.
Figure 21, right: A LS Means Plot to compare number of fixations for each participant according to
viewpoint showed that questions about “other” resulted in a higher amount of fixations.
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Table 7: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for number of fixations. One individual had a
significant difference between the number of fixations in MIB and ToM stimuli. There were seven
instances of participants having a significant difference between number of fixations for self versus other
stimuli.
Participant
101
103
104
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Compare
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations
Number of Fixations
Number of Fixations

Significance
P = 0.9987
P = 0.8506
P = 0.6883

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.8506

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.5174

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.0001*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.7060

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.5749

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.0109*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.0028*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.1852

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.1495

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.1434

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.0282*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.7716

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.0054*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.7803

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P < 0.0001*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.0665

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P < 0.0001*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.8727

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.1804

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.2959

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.0924

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.8703

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.1299

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.5867

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Number of Fixations

P = 0.0285*

PUPIL DIAMETER
An ANOVA and t-test indicated significance (p = 0.0001) between bias response
with respect to pupil diameter. Pupil diameter is significantly lower when the participants
viewed stimuli that elicited MIB responses compared to that of ToM responses. Three
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participants showed a significant effect between MIB and ToM. In two participants, MIB
responses had the lower value of pupil diameter and, interestingly, the third had a higher
diameter. The average pupil diameters for all participants by bias category can be seen
in Figure 22. One participant showed significance between pupil diameters in comparison
to question viewpoint. In this case, questions about self elicited a lower pupil diameter. A
comparison of each participant’s pupil diameter for the question viewpoints can be seen
in Figure 23. P-values that showed significance for the t-tests for each participant can be
seen in Table 8. Two participants had unusable data and therefore had to be excluded
from analysis.

Figure 22, left: A LS Means Plot to compare pupil diameter for each participant according to MIB and ToM
seems to show no general trend, although a t-test showed significance. Pupil diameter is significantly
lower when the participants viewed stimuli that elicited MIB responses compared to that of ToM
responses
Figure 23, right: A LS Means Plot to compare pupil diameter for each participant according to viewpoint
seems to show no general trend.
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Table 8: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for pupil diameter. Three participants had a
significant difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to pupil diameter. One of the participants
showed significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to pupil diameter.
Participant
101
103
104
106
107
108
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Compare
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter
Pupil Diameter
Pupil Diameter

Significance
P = 0.0519
P = 0.4876
P = 0.0047*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.8040

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.9580

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.2714

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.5252

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.1446

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.4098

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.2083

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.9716

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.8890

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.0279*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.3005

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.3530

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.0741

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.3583

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.2589

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.5594

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.6979

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.5473

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.0019*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P < 0.0001*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.3944

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.4817

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Pupil Diameter

P = 0.8451

BLINK RATE
A comparison of the presented bias to blink rate through a t-test showed no
statistical significance (p = 0.1205). Participant 106 had the lowest average blink rate at
11.2 blinks per minute and the highest was participant 115 with 29.95 blinks per minute.
The average bpm for all participants was 17.91 (s.d. 7.05). The blink rates for the
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participants comparing the different biases can be seen in Figure 24. A t-test comparing
the viewpoint of the question (self versus other) to the blink rate indicated no statistical
significance (p = 0.2754). Questions about self had a lower average blink rate (m. =
17.457, s.d. = 0.583) than questions about other (m. = 18.349, s.d. = 0.571). A
comparison of each participant’s blink rate for the different question viewpoints can be
seen in Figure 25. The interaction between the bias and the viewpoint of the question also
showed no significance on blink rate (p = 0.8237). P-values that showed significance for
the t-tests for each participant can be seen in Table 9. Five participants had unusable data
and therefore had to be excluded from analysis.

Figure 24, left: A LS Means Plot to compare blink rate for each participant according to MIB and ToM
shows no general trend.
Figure 25, right: A LS Means Plot to compare blink rate for each participant according to viewpoint shows
no general trend.
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Table 9: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for blink rate. Two participants had a significant
difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to blink rate. One of the participants showed
significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to blink rate.
Participant
101
104
106
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Compare
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate
Blink Rate
Blink Rate

Significance
P = 0.6100
P = 0.5696
P = 0.9473

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.5500

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate

P = 0.6262

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.8019

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate

P = 0.4161

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.1359

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate

P = 0.9338

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.1488

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate

P = 0.0037*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.1213

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate

P = 0.0452*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.6336

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate

P = 0.8512

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.9080

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate

P = 0.5533

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.6818

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Blink Rate

P = 0.9683

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Blink Rate

P = 0.0237*

NORMALIZED GSR
An example of the GSR output can be seen in Figure 26 for the different
categories of response: TOM response for both “other” and “self,” and MIB response for
both “other” and “self.” As seen by this specific example ToM resulted in higher GSR
measurements. This exemplifies the fact that research has shown that as GSR increases,
cognitive workload also increases. (Shi, Ruiz, Taib, Choi, & Chen , 2007).
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GSR Measurement for Bias
8

GSR VALUE (microvolts)

7

TOM 02Other
TOM 02Self
MIB 15Other
MIB 15Self

6
5
4
3
2
1

0.0
0.5
0.9
1.4
1.8
2.3
2.7
3.2
3.6
4.1
4.5
5.0
5.4
5.9
6.4
6.8
7.3
7.7
8.2
8.6
9.1
9.5
10.0
10.4
10.9
11.3
11.8
12.2
12.7

0
Time from start of stimuli

Figure 26: An example of the GSR measurements of an example of MIB and ToM response indicates that
GSR value was lower over the entire length of a stimuli when participants were viewing a stimuli that
elicited MIB.

An ANOVA and t-test indicated no significance (p = 0.1211) between MIB and
ToM response with respect to normalized GSR. Upon further investigation of the data,
two participants showed a significant effect between MIB and ToM. For one participant,
MIB GSR was significantly higher. However, for another participant, ToM GSR was
significantly higher. Each of the GSR values for the participants comparing MIB and
ToM can be seen in Figure 27. None of the participants showed significance between
GSR for question viewpoints. Each participant’s pupil diameter for the different question
viewpoints can be seen in Figure 28. P-values that showed significance for the t-tests for
each participant are shown in Table 10. Three participants had unusable data and
therefore had to be excluded from analysis.
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Figure 27, left: A LS Means Plot to compare normalized GSR for each participant according to MIB and
ToM shows conflicting results. However, the general trend – save one participant - shows that GSR was
lower in stimuli that elicited the MIB compared to stimuli that elicited ToM.
Figure 28, right: A LS Means Plot to compare normalized GSR for each participant according to viewpoint
shows no general trend. In fact, several of the participants had opposing results.
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Table 10: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for GSR. Two participants had a significant
difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to normalized GSR. None of the participants showed
significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to pupil diameter.
Participant
101
102
103
104
106
107
108
110
111
112
113
115

Compare
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR
Normalized GSR
Normalized GSR
Normalized GSR
Normalized GSR

Significance
P = 0.8718
P = 0.9799
P = 0.2592
P = 0.3210
P = 0.4043

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.6330

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.0423*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.0971

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.4656

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.3684

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.5991

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.8942

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.3795

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.6239

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.7472

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.7776

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.9707

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.8534

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.5236

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.6610

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.8370

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.9468

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.0316*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Normalized GSR

P = 0.3484

EMG1 - ORBICULARIS OCULI
A t-test to compare average EMG for the orbicularis oculi between participants
showed that many were different from others (p < 0.0001), which is to be expected.
Average EMG for all participants was 12.649 (s.d. 2.87). A t-test comparing bias result
(MIB vs. ToM) to the EMG showed no statistical significance (p = 0.2919). EMG of
MIB responses had a lower average EMG (m. = 12.566, s.d. = 0.128) than ToM
responses (m. = 12.787, s.d. = 0.165). Each of the EMG values for the participants
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comparing MIB and ToM can be seen in Figure 29. A t-test comparing the viewpoint of
the question (self vs. other) to the EMG showed no statistical significance (p = 0.2514).
EMG of questions about self had a higher average EMG rating (m. = 12.533, s.d. =
0.143) than questions about other (m. = 12.766, s.d. = 0.143). A comparison of each
participant’s pupil diameter for the different question viewpoints can be seen in Figure
30. The interaction between the bias and the viewpoint of the question also showed no
significance on EMG rating (p = 0.8921). P-values that showed significance for the t-tests
for each participant can be seen in Table 11. Two participants had unusable data and
therefore had to be excluded from analysis.

Figure 29, left: A LS Means Plot to compare average EMG for each participant according to MIB and ToM
shows no general trend. In fact, several of the participants had opposing results.
Figure 30, right: A LS Means Plot to compare average EMG for each participant according to viewpoint
shows no general trend.
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Table 11: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for EMG of the Orbicularis Occuli. Two
participants had a significant difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to EMG of the
Orbicularis Occuli. The same two participants showed significance when comparing “self” to “other”
stimuli with respect to EMG of the Orbicularis Occuli.
Participant
101
102
104
106
107
108
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Compare
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG
Temple EMG
Temple EMG
Temple EMG
Temple EMG

Significance
P = 0.9224
P = 0.8984
P = 0.9900
P = 0.9314
P = 0.8518

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.6383

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.8923

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.4931

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.0528

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.9703

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.9848

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.9928

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.9891

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.9243

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.6416

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.7151

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.7671

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.8884

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.8448

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.4644

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.9128

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.5745

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P < 0.0001*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.0258*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Temple EMG

P = 0.0453*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Temple EMG

P = 0.0084*

EMG2 - MEDIAL FRONTALIS
A t-test to compare average EMG of the medial frontalis between participants
showed that many were different from others (p < 0.0001). Average EMG for all
participants was 7.802 (s.d. 2.87). A t-test compared the bias result (MIB vs. ToM) to the
medial frontalis EMG; no statistical significance was shown (p = 0.6680). EMG of ToM
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responses had a lower average EMG (m. = 7.752, s.d. = 0.146) than MIB responses (m. =
7.832, s.d. = 0.113). EMG values comparing MIB and ToM for the participants can be
seen in Figure 31. A t-test compared the viewpoint of the question (self vs. other) to the
EMG; no statistical significance was shown (p = 0.0875). EMG of questions about self
had a higher average EMG (m. = 7.955, s.d. = 0.126) than questions about other (m. =
7.648, s.d. = 0.126). ). A comparison each participant’s EMG for the different question
viewpoints can be seen in Figure 32. The interaction between the bias and the question
viewpoint also showed no significance on EMG rating (p = 0.9453). P-values that
showed significance for the t-tests for each participant can be seen in Table 12. Three
participants had unusable data and therefore had to be excluded from analysis.

Figure 31, left: A LS Means Plot to compare average EMG for each participant according to MIB and ToM
shows no general trend.
Figure 32, right: A LS Means Plot to compare average EMG for each participant according to viewpoint
shows that there is a slight trend where the “other” stimuli has a lower EMG compared to “self” stimuli.
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Table 12: P-values for all t-tests done for each participant for EMG of the Medial Frontalis. One participant
had a significant difference when comparing MIB to TOM with respect to EMG of the Medial Frontalis.
Three of the participants showed significance when comparing “self” to “other” stimuli with respect to
EMG of the Medial Frontalis.
Participant
101
102
104
106
107
108
110
111
112
113
114
115

Compare
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)
Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)
Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG
Brow EMG
Brow EMG
Brow EMG
Brow EMG

Significance
P = 0.6138
P = 0.0001*
P = 0.8427
P = 0.8267
P = 0.8945

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.7552

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P = 0.5130

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.2962

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P = 0.3154

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.6989

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P = 0.5792

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.9011

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P = 0.5511

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.5412

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P = 0.8171

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.3075

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P = 0.8891

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.6341

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P = 0.9343

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.9722

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P = 0.5556

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P < 0.0001*

Bias Response (MIB/TOM)

Brow EMG

P < 0.0001*

Question Viewpoint (Self/Other)

Brow EMG

P = 0.0160*
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V.

DISCUSSION

Results and statistical analysis show that MIB is a way humans – knowingly or
not – mitigate high cognitive workload situations. It is essentially a mental shortcut to be
able to come to a decision in a faster manner. This is shown most directly in the statistical
test for response time. Although a t-test indicated there was no significant difference in
time between MIB and ToM, several participants showed a statistical significance in their
results. In each of these cases, MIB had a lesser response time than ToM. In terms of the
questions viewpoint, questions about the person in the stimuli took a significantly longer
amount of time. This shows that people spent less time thinking about a response for
themselves – and that it requires more cognition to understand that another person might
not necessarily answer in the same manner.
Another measure that has been used in relation to cognitive workload has been the
use of visual measures. Research has shown as tasks became harder, and therefore more
cognitively involved, that people gaze at figures for much longer (Just and Carpenter,
1978). Similarly, the location of fixations is important to understand cognitive processes
and that if one can understand the relationship between the two that they can understand
fully the cognitive processes. Significance between MIB and ToM in terms of the number
of fixations was shown in one participant. In this case MIB had more fixations than ToM
– suggesting lower overall cognitive workload and therefore are taking “shortcuts” in
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their decision making process. With respect to the viewpoint of the question in the
stimuli, a general trend shows that participants had a higher number of fixations when
looking at questions about “other.”
In terms of the next measure, pupil diameter, three participants had a significant
difference between MIB and ToM responses. Research has shown that sustained
cognitive load was accompanied by sustained pupil dilation. In other words, when a
person has a high level of cognitive workload they have a likelihood of having a higher
pupil diameter. Two out of three of the participants had a lower diameter when viewing
stimuli that elicited MIB, however, one participant had a higher diameter when viewing
MIB eliciting stimuli. When looking at the general trend of pupil diameter with respect to
question viewpoint, “self” versus “other” had similar responses.
The final visual measure, blink rate, had two participants that showed a significant
difference between MIB and ToM responses. In both cases the MIB responses had a
lower blink rate. This is reflected in literature that suggests blinks flank periods of change
in cognitive load (Siegle, Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008) and that blink rate decreased
during reading tasks (Bentivoglio, Bressman, Cassetta, Carretta, Tonali, & Albanese,
1997). When looking at the general trend of blink rate with respect to question viewpoint,
“self” versus “other” had similar responses.
Physiological measures have been proven to be good determinants of cognitive
workload – and may be potentially good determinants of the possibility of MIB. The first,
GSR has shown that the higher the GSR frequency, the more mentally involved a subject
is (Nourbakhsh, Want, Chen, 2013). Two participants showed significant difference
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between MIB and ToM responses with respect to a normalized GSR rating. In one case,
the MIB GSR was lower than that of ToM. However, in the other participant, the
opposite was the case. When looking at the LS Means plot, which compares the average
of each participant, the general trend of the participants showed a lower GSR rating for
MIB responses. This reflects research in the GSR field and helps to support that people
are more cognitively involved when following ToM. In terms of the GSR responses with
respect to the question viewpoint, there was no visible trend.
In terms of both EMG – of the orbicularis oculi and medial frontalis, both had
participants that showed significance between MIB and ToM responses. EMG of the
orbicularis oculi had higher rating than that of the medial frontalis. This can be attributed
to the different locations. The medial frontalis simply takes the movements when
participants are doing hard concentration or confusion – movements in which the
participant would furrow their brow. obicularis oculi not only takes the movement of
squinting and large movements of the area around the eye, but also normal eye
movements like blinking. Therefore, measurements of the obicularis oculi have a higher
rating. One participant showed significance in both EMG locations, and in both cases
MIB had a significantly lower EMG rating. This supports research that suggests that
increases in slow-wave EEG have been associated with decreased alertness, and therefore
decreased cognitive workload (Wright & McGown, 2001). In terms of the EMG of both
obicularis oculi and medial frontalis, there was no observable trend with respect to the
viewpoint of the question.
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The metrics employed in this experiment reinforce the notion that humans exhibit
MIB in high workload situations. The observed measures align with prior research.
Because ToM is the ability to predict and interpret the thoughts and actions of another by
taking on their perspective. An individual is more mentally involved in order to consider
both viewpoints and come to the conclusion that another person can take a differing
viewpoint than themselves. However, in the case of MIB, which is when analysts
perceive and process information through the filter of personal experience, a person is
less involved cognitively. This may be due to shortcutting to personal experience rather
than considering facts presented. Further, it is important to note that MIB is a real-life
problem, and our experiment has shown that it may occur at a higher rate than ToM.

CONCLUSION
“Development of a normative theory of intelligence has been inhibited
because the lessons of hindsight do not guarantee improvement in
foresight, and hypothetical solutions to failure only occasionally produce
improvement in practice” (Betts, 1978, p. 36).
Although it is impossible to eliminate all human error; due to the severe
consequences, it is consequential to assist analysts detect and mitigate situations that may
lead to erroneous decision making. MIB and ToM were reviewed to investigate their
roles in analysts’ decision making processes when predicting the future behaviors of an
enemy. In predicting other cultures behavior, numerous bias may be present. MIB is
thought to have three possible causes: ToM, a cultural bias, and mindreading. All three
may be prevalent in the work of analysts.
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Through testing, a deeper understanding of MIB has been sought. It is found that
MIB is enticed 40.1% of the time and Theory of Mind is enticed 21.2% of the time when
viewing imagery of different cultures. The best measure of MIB and ToM in this
experiment was average pupil diameter. If this experiment is representative of realistic
operating environments, analyst pupil diameter may be a good indicator of MIB.
Although the psychological measures employed in this experiment failed to reach
significance, additional metrics may provide a more robust understanding of MIB
occurrences. When delving into individual participants, several showed a significant
effect between MIB and ToM with respect to the measurements. All of this analysis goes
to suggest that MIB is a cognitive shortcut people use – whether it’s known or un-known
– in order to reduce mental workload in an intelligence setting.
Considering that analysts have to deal with these biases on a day to day basis –
especially MIB – it is important to be able to find a way to mitigate the full effects of the
bias in them. Granted, not all biases are bad. Some, if not all, are used as a mental
shortcut. If an analyst were to consider all aspects of the data provided – without the use
of some sort of cognitive heuristic – they would be overwhelmed and unable to complete
their tasks in a reasonable amount of time. We don’t want to completely eliminate the
bias, simply alert them to when they might be susceptible to it.
The research presented and the results from the experiment suggest that the use of
pupil diameter as an indicator might be a good possibility. A real-time tracking of the
pupil diameter could help analysts realize when they are falling prey to MIB. In order to
have a proper implementation, analysts would either have to have a computer that tracked
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the pupil diameter through the use of cameras, or through the use of glasses that tracked
the measurement. As mentioned earlier, a lower pupil diameter in our experiment was
significantly related to the possibility of MIB. In research, a lower pupil diameter has
suggested a lower cognitive workload. If the pupil diameter of the analyst is decreased to
a level that is out of a specific range it could potentially alert them to the possibility of
their susceptibility to the MIB.
In the future, bias prevalence in group decision making should be investigated. In
reality, most analysts don’t necessarily work as a single entity, but rather as a group of
people analyzing data. Similarly it would be beneficial to investigate the degree other
cultures exhibit MIB.

Countermeasures shall also be developed because without

effective countermeasures, biases – as well as other human-based errors – will inevitably
creep into the intelligence community. Even though modern intelligence communities
operate out of the public eye, academic institutions may provide the necessary re-sources
to facilitate incremental advancements similar to our findings that highlight aspects of
analyst work that can be improved.
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APPENDIX A: Pre-Questionnaire
PRE-QUESTIONNAIRE

Please answer the following questions. All answers will be confidential.
1. What is your gender? Please circle one: Male

Female

2. What is your age? __________
3. Are you color blind? Please circle one: Yes

No

4. Do you have any type of visual impairment? Please circle one: Yes

No

5. How would you best describe your cultural background? Please circle one:
African

Arabic

Asian

Caucasian

Hispanic

Other: Please specify_______

6. Were your parents or grandparents born in another country? Please circle one:
Yes

No

7. Do you feel a close affiliation with another culture? Please circle one: Yes

No

If yes, which and why?
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
8. Have you studied another culture? Please circle one: Yes

No

If yes, which and for what purpose? ____________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B: Post-Questionnaire
POST-QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What did you use as the predominant cue for finding an answer to the questions asked?
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

______________________________________________________________________________
When unsure about the answer to the question, what most influenced your decision?
______________________________________________________________________________
Did you make any assumptions when finding an answer to the questions asked?
Please circle one:
Yes
No
If yes, what were some assumptions you made?
______________________________________________________________________________
Did anything stand out to you in the images?
Please circle one:
Yes
No
If yes, what in particular stood out to you?
______________________________________________________________________________
Were there any distractions in the images?
Please circle one:
Yes
No
If yes, what were the distractions?
______________________________________________________________________________
In the images, did the environment in which the people were in play a role in your answers?
Please circle one:
Yes
No
Comments:

7. In the images, did the persons’ race play a role in your answers?
Please circle one:

Yes

No

Comments:

8. In the images, did the persons’ age play a role in your answers?
Please circle one:

Yes

No

Comments:

9. In the images, did the persons’ culture play a role in your answers?
Please circle one:

Yes

No

Comments:

10. In the images, did the persons’ name play a in your answers?
Please circle one:

Yes

No

Comments:

11. In the images, did the persons’ religion play a role in your answers?
Please circle one:

Yes

No

Comments:
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APPENDIX C: Stimuli Set
Picture

Audio

Other Question

Self Question

Culture

Gender

Phrase

Correct
Other
Resp.

Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism
Sub Topic: Assume Responsibility
Sergei notices a
pollution violation
in the steel mill
where he is
employed.

Is Sergei likely
to take the
blame for the
violation?

Would you be
likely to take
the blame for
the violation?

Russia

Male

Pos

Yes

Akiyo notices a
bookkeeping error
that his company
has been making
for the last 5 years.

Is Akiyo likely to
say the error
was his fault?

Would you be
likely to say the
error was your
fault?

Japan

Male

Neg

Yes

Chun, a manger for
a manufacturing
company, has
noticed that lead is
being put into
children’s toys.

Is Chun likely to
admit to the
violation?

Would you be
likely to admit
to the
violation?

China

Female

Pos

Yes

Russia

Female

Neg

No

Russia

Female

Pos

Yes

Japan

Female

Neg

No

Japan

Male

Pos

Yes

China

Male

Pos

Yes

Will Valentina
Would you let
let her
your supervisor
supervisor
assume
assume
responsibility
responsibility
for the error?
for the error?
Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism
Sub Topic: Let Others Share

Valentina realizes
that she sent a
large product
shipment to the
wrong customer.

Petrova's family
farm yielded a
quality crop
following a severe
drought.

Is Petrova likely
to distribute the
crop with
disadvantaged
farmers?

Would you
distribute the
crop to
disadvantaged
farmers?

Akimi received a
bonus for her
family for
completing a recent
project?

Will Akimi
choose to
spend all of the
bonus on
herself?
Is Etsuo likely to
share his
meager
earnings with
his extended
family?

Would you
choose to
spend all of the
bonus on
yourself?
Would you
share your
meager
earnings with
your extended
family?

Will Cheng
purchase gifts
for friends?

Would you
purchase gifts
for friends?

Etsuo, a Japanese
fisherman, has just
ended a season
with a small yield.
Cheng, after trying
for years, finally
won 1,000 yen in a
Chinese lottery.
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Picture

Audio

Other Question

Self Question

Culture

Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism
Sub Topic: Sacrifice
Mitsuo's work is
Will Mitsuo
Would you
crucial to the
relocate to
relocate to
success of the
ensure the
ensure the
Japan
construction
successful
successful
company he works
construction of
construction of
for.
a skyrise?
a skyrise?
Would you
Will Fu reject a
reject a
Fu has been an elite
classified
classified
member of the
position that
position that
Chinese Republican
would prevent
China
would prevent
Army for several
him from
you from
years.
having a
having a
family?
family?
Fang enjoys going
Will Fang likely
to the Tianjin
Would you quit
quit attending
University, but her
attending the
the University
China
family is struggling
university to
to return
to harvest this
return home?
home?
year's crop.
Anya is training to
Is Anya likely to
Would you
become a
continue her
likely continue
cosmonaut, but her
training to
your training to
Russia
mother is struggling
become a
become a
to care for her
cosmonaut?
cosmonaut?
ailing father.
Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism
Sub Topic: Value of Group Success/ Well-Being

Gender

Phrase

Correct
Other
Resp.

Male

Pos

Yes

Male

Neg

No

Female

Pos

Yes

Female

Neg

No

Dimitri's schooling
is beginning to
negatively impact
his employer's
productivity.

Will Dimitri
likely stop his
education?

Would you
likely stop your
education?

Russia

Male

Pos

Yes

Alexi and his close
friends have
recently become
radicalized by an
Eastern bloc militia.

Will he lose
interest in his
career in favor
of the militia's
agenda?

Would you lose
interest in your
career in favor
of the militia’s
agenda?

Russia

Male

Pos

Yes

Chiya, a key
employee at an
accounting firm,
just received a job
offer from a larger
firm.

Will she accept
the offer, even
if her current
firm will suffer?

Would you
accept the
offer, even if
the current firm
would suffer?

Japan

Female

Neg

No

Tai, a Chinese
engineer, notices a
design flaw one
week before a
project is due.

Is Tai likely to
ignore the flaw
and let her
group continue
working on the
problem?

Would you
ignore the flaw
and let your
group continue
working on the
problem?

China

Female

Neg

No
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Picture

Audio

Other Question

Self Question

Culture

Gender

Phrase

Correct
Other
Resp.

Main Topic: Individualism vs. Collectivism
Sub Topic: Importance of Group Inclusion
Youka has recently
been invited to join
an elite academic
society in Tokyo.

Will Youka lie
about her job to
fit in with the
group?

Would you lie
about your job
in order to fit in
with the group.

Japan

Female

Pos

Yes

Hua has just
transferred
departments within
her current
investment
company.

Will Hua speak
candidly of her
past co-workers
to win friends?

Would you
speak candidly
of your past coworkers to win
friends?

China

Female

Pos

Yes

China

Male

Neg

No

Russia

Male

Neg

No

Would you be
likely to think
the meetings
she leads are
the most
productive?

China

Female

Neg

No

Would you feel
the meetings
are better when
he leads them
instead of his
female
counterpart

China

Male

Pos

Yes

Would you let
your female
employee lead
the weekly
meetings?

Mexico

Male

Neg

No

Would you
consider the
weekly meeting
effective when
run by the
female
director?

Japan

Female

Neg

No

Would you get
lunch at
another
restaurant
instead of
eating with
your coworkers?
Andrei lives in a
Is Andrei likely
Would you
small farming
to accept the
accept the offer
village and has just
offer and leave
and leave your
received a job offer
his family and
friends and
in Moscow.
friends behind?
family behind?
Main Topic: Masculinity vs. Femininity
Sub Topic: Meeting efficient when run by men
Hao dislikes Indian
food, but all of his
coworkers eat at
the local Indian
restaurant during
the week.

Yin attends several
corporate meetings
on a weekly basis
for her research
position.

Tung is an assertive
and ambitious
employee at his
factory where he
manages finances.
Alejandro is a drug
manufacturer in
Mexico city, and
travels a lot for
business.

Katsu really enjoys
volunteering at her
local dog shelter
every weekend.

Is Hao likely to
get lunch at
another
restaurant
instead of
where his
coworkers eat?

Is Yin likely to
feel the
meetings she
leads are most
productive?
Does Tung think
that meetings
are better when
he leads them
instead of his
female
counterpart?
Will Alejandro
let his female
employee lead
the weekly
meetings while
he is away?
Does Katsu
consider the
weekly meeting
at the shelter
effective when
run by the
female
director?
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Picture

Audio

Other Question

Self Question

Culture

Gender

Phrase

Correct
Other
Resp.

Main Topic: Masculinity vs. Femininity
Sub Topic: Men Solve Problems with Logic vs. Intuition
Yoshimi is having
unexplainable
mechanical issues
with his new
automobile.

Will Yoshimi
pursue
troubleshooting
steps to fix the
issue?

Would you
pursue
troubleshooting
steps to fix the
issue?

Japan

Male

Pos

Yes

Cho is having
trouble
determining the
cause of a problem
with her cell phone.

Will Cho keep
using the phone
until the
pattern of
symptoms
points to the
cause?

Would you
keep using the
phone until the
symptoms point
to the cause?

Japan

Female

Pos

No

Jie is a cyberengineer for the
Chinese
Government who
spends most of his
time combating
hacking.

Will Jie likely
use his instinct
as his dominant
problem solving
strategy?

Would you
likely use your
instinct as the
dominant
problem solving
strategy?

China

Male

Neg

No

Female

Neg

No

Is Amaya likely
Would you
to write a
write a
computer
computer
Mexico
algorithm to
algorithm to
help resolve the help resolve the
problem?
problem?
Main Topic: Masculinity vs. Femininity
Sub Topic: Men Solve Problems with Dominant Approach

Amaya is facing
constant problems
managing and
keeping up with her
finances.

Ignacio has been
having several task
and interpersonal
issues with a new
co-worker.
Carlotta has been
getting a poor
reputation because
her community
director is
spreading rumors.
Xing has not been
sleeping very well
due to a noisy and
rude neighbor.
Etsuko is struggling
to advance in her
career as a
paralegal assistant
in Osaka.

Is Ignacio likely
to confront the
co-worker?
Will Carlotta
seek to
discredit these
rumors by
creating some
of her own?
Will he likely
seek the help of
others to help
him with the
neighbor?
Will Etsuko
discuss it with
her boss and
ask for a
promotion?
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Would you be
likely to
confront the coworker?

Mexico

Male

Pos

Yes

Would you seek
to discredit
rumors by
creating some
of your own?

Mexico

Female

Pos

Yes

Would you seek
the help of
others to help
him with the
neighbor?

China

Male

Neg

No

Would you
discuss it with
your boss and
ask for a
promotion?

Japan

Female

Neg

No

Picture

Audio

Other Question

Self Question

Main Topic: Masculinity vs. Femininity
Sub Topic: Pick Men As Leaders
Jiao is employed as
Would you be
a seamstress in a
Is she likely to
likely to apply
sewing factory in a
apply as a shiftas a shiftlarge Beijing
leader?
leader?
district.
Would you
Regina is very
Does Regina
search for a
unsatisfied with her
search for a
male candidate
local civic
male candidate
instead of
leadership in
instead of
running
Nogales, Mexico.
running herself?
yourself?
Shen is asked to
Is Shen likely to
Would you be
provide feedback
provide better
likely to provide
on two candidates
feedback about
better feedback
for shift manager at
a male
about a male
his factory.
candidate?
candidate?
Would you
Does Hiro likely
Hiro is competing
believe that he
believe that he
for a manager
would be a
is a better
position against a
better
candidate than
female with equal
candidate than
the female
experience.
the female
candidate?
candidate?
Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance
Sub Topic: Prefer Unstructured Situations
Eduardo has begun
Is Eduardo
Would you be
negotiating and
satisfied in
satisfied in
acting as a
dealing with
dealing with
mediator for
this chaotic
this chaotic
quarreling native
situation?
situation?
tribes.
Ernesta was just
Is Ernesta likely
Would you ask
hired as a server.
to ask the other
the other
On her first day of
servers about
servers about
training, she is
the job
the job
instructed to
throughout the
throughout the
observe other
day?
day?
servers.
Will Diedrich
Would you
Diedrich is traveling
attempt to
attempt to
to a new region in
drive to his
drive to your
Southern Germany
destination
destination
for a festival.
without getting
without getting
directions?
directions?
Will Masako
Would you take
Masako has just
take a hands on
a hands on
begun learning and
approach and
approach and
practicing the
forgo the
forgo the
ancient craft of
lessons in her
lessons in the
Okimono.
textbook?
textbook?
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Culture

Gender

Phrase

Correct
Other
Resp.

China

Female

Neg

No

Mexico

Female

Pos

Yes

China

Male

Pos

Yes

Japan

Male

Pos

Yes

Mexico

Male

Pos

Yes

Mexico

Female

Neg

No

Germany

Male

Neg

Yes

Japan

Female

Pos

Yes

Picture

Audio

Other Question

Self Question

Culture

Gender

Phrase

Correct
Other
Resp.

Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance
Sub Topic: Prefer Broad Guidelines
Curt works on a
mass assembly line
that does not
regularly observe
safety standards.

Is Curt likely to
search for new
employment?

Would you be
likely to search
for new
employment?

Germany

Male

Neg

No

Freida was not
given clear
instructions for her
new job at the local
power plant in
Munich

Is Freida likely
to ask her
supervisor for
additional task
instructions?

Would you be
likely to ask
your supervisor
for additional
task
instructions?

Germany

Female

Pos

No

Is Daniela likely
to sew the
garments
despite being
given unclear
instructions?

Would you sew
the garments
despite being
given unclear
instructions?

Mexico

Female

Neg

Yes

Male

Pos

No

Male

Neg

No

Female

Pos

No

Male

Neg

Yes

Female

Pos

No

Daniela, a
seamstress in
Jalisco, received an
order, but no
measurements
were given except
length.
Toshiro's manager
had to leave the
office early, and left
him to finish a
proposal without
sufficient
information.

Is Toshiro likely
Would you
to consult his
consult your
coworkers to
coworkers to
gather the
gather the
Japan
information to
information to
complete the
complete the
proposal?
proposal?
Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance
Sub Topic: Not Stressed When Outcomes Cannot be Predicted
Huang is scientist
Does Huang
Would you
who is heavily
second guess
second guess
invested in a risky
being overbeing overJapan
research and
stretched
stretched
development
financially?
financially?
project.
Will Ishi worry
Would you
about the
worry about the
Ishi was given a
diagnosis to the
diagnosis to the
vague diagnosis of
point of
point of
Japan
her abdominal pain
pursuing a
pursuing a
by her doctor.
second
second
opinion?
opinion?
Luis was informed
Is Luis likely to
Would you go
that there will be
go on about his
on about your
layoffs next month
work and life as
work and life as
Mexico
at the textile
usual, despite
usual, despite
factory where he
the warning of
the warning of
works.
layoffs?
layoffs?
Olga learned that
Is Olga likely to
Would you
the sausage she
pursue
pursue
served her family
additional info.
additional info.
last week may have
about the
about the
Germany
been part of a
recalled meat
recalled meat
contamination
and its effects
and its effects
recall.
on her family?
on your family?
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Picture

Audio

Other Question

Self Question

Culture

Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance
Sub Topic: Take Risks When Outcomes Cannot Be Predicted?
Helga is thinking
Will Helga
Would you
Germany
about buying a home
demand an
demand an
in Hamburg, but is
inspection
inspection
new to home buying
before buying a
before buying a
and renovation.
property?
property?
Ullrich's friend asks
him if he wants to
buy stock in a startup
technology company
in Munich.

Is Ullrich likely to
Would you buy
Germany
buy stock in the
stock in the
startup without
startup without
extensively
extensively
researching the
researching the
company first?
company first?
Garcia has just been
Is Garcia likely to
Would you
Mexico
offered a slightly
accept the job
accept the job
higher paying job
offer without
offer without
several towns away.
learning the
learning the
details?
details?
Hatsumi works for an
Is Hatsumi likely
Would you be
Japan
auto maker with a
to purchase a
likely to
program for
new automobile
purchase a new
employees to
from her
automobile from
purchase refurbished company instead
your company
vehicles.
of a refurbished
instead of a
one?
refurbished one?
Main Topic: Uncertainty Avoidance
Sub Topic: Rules Should Not Be Broken for Mere Pragmatic Reasons
Javier has an unfair
Will Javier look
Would you look
Mexico
opportunity to see
at his scores
at your scores
his test score before
early?
early?
other students.

Gender

Phrase

Correct
Other
Resp.

Female

Neg

No

Male

Pos

Yes

Male

Pos

No

Female

Neg

Yes

Male

Neg

No

Akio must wait to
begin the exam until
all students receive
the test booklet.

Will Akio begin
the test early?

Would you begin
the test early?

Japan

Male

Neg

No

Consuela is about to
put money down for
a home purchase in
Juarez Mexico.

Will she likely
make a low bid
and run the risk
of being outbid?

Would you make
a low bid and run
the risk of being
outbid?

Mexico

Female

Pos

Yes

Brigetta knows that a
co-worker is planning
a surprise party for
someone in the
office.

Will Brigetta
snoop around to
figure out the
details of the
party?

Would you
snoop around to
figure out the
details of the
party?

Germany

Female

Pos

No
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